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CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WAR POWER
by Allan Ides*
I. INTRODUCTION
That the national government has the power, both practical and
constitutional, to place this nation at war is a given. That this power,
potentially the most destructive and despotic of all powers vested in
governments, is a necessity is no less plain. But our Constitution does
more than create a national government with specified powers. Just as
plainly as the Constitution grants or creates powers, it places limita-
tions upon the exercise of those powers. Some of those limitations are
specific negatives on governmental action, such as the proscriptions
found in the Bill of Rights; others are structural devices designed to
prevent the exercise of arbitrary power and to promote the ideals of a
republican government. The specific negative restraints tend to wilt at
the invocation of the war power.' As a consequence, limitations of the
structural type provide, perhaps, the most important constitutional re-
straint upon exercises of that power. In this regard, the separation of
powers principle is of prime importance. That principle is designed, in
part, to prevent the exercise of arbitrary war making power by placing
in Congress the primary responsibility for determining the nation's mil-
itary policy. If the dog of war is to be unleashed, if our freedoms are to
risk dilution, then it shall only be upon a conscious choice by our most
representative branch.
It would not be overstating the case to remark that of late the sepa-
ration of powers principle has not fared well in the war making context.
Congress, as a practical matter, retains only a small residuum of its
constitutionally mandated authority and responsibility. Power has de-
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1. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), in which Justice Holmes,
writing for the Court, observed: "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right." See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
volved to the presidency through a combined process of abdication,
usurpation and political complacence. Presidential predominance over
the power to make war is a given. Yet, unless one views the Constitu-
tion as a mere technicality to be followed only when convenient or ac-
cepts the theory that the Constitution can be amended by consistent
violation of its most basic principles, the current allocations of war
making authority ought to be cause for deep concern.
The War Powers Resolution of 19732 was ostensibly designed to
insert congressional responsibility back into the war making power and
by so doing to reestablish the lines of authority and responsibility man-
dated by the Constitution. The specific question now to be pursued is
whether, or the extent to which, the Resolution has succeeded in so
doing. Events in 1983, particularly the invasion of Grenada and the
Marine deployment in Lebanon, provide ominous insight regarding the
Constitutionality and effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution.
These issues, however, cannot be addressed without first examining the
structural allocations of authority provided by the Constitution. Nor
can the efficacy of the War Powers Resolution be fully appreciated
without some awareness of the constitutional breakdown that preceded
its adoption.
II. THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATIONS
The Constitution grants political power to the national govern-
ment; it assigns responsibilities over that power to the separate
branches. Aside from internal housekeeping matters, no single branch
is given complete political authority over any particular substantive
power. This describes, in simple terms, the mechanics of the principle
of separation of powers. It would be more accurately called a principle
of separation of functions or authority since it does not involve a sepa-
ration of substantive powers, but a division of duties over powers
granted to the national government. Thus, article I, section 8 of the
Constitution appears to grant to Congress a vast array of powers. For
example, it states that, "Congress shall have Power. . . . To regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . ." Although this lan-
guage literally grants only Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce and although neither article II (the executive branch) nor
article III (the judicial branch) mentions the interstate commerce
power, this power is quite plainly lodged in the national government as
a whole. Specifically, the authority to exercise that or any other sub-
2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
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stantive power is, under the structure of our government, separated into
its legislative, executive and judicial components with each branch as-
suming its appropriate sphere of responsibility.
The respective role of each branch can be demonstrated by a sim-
ple hypothetical. During the administration of President Carter the na-
tion was faced with a severe energy shortage. The President made the
adoption of a national energy policy a top priority for his administra-
tion. Indeed, he described the energy problems facing our nation as,
"The moral equivalent of war.' 3 The negotiations between the Presi-
dent and Congress in developing a comprehensive energy package
were long and tedious with some observers speculating that the two
branches would never reach a suitable compromise. However, eventu-
ally a consensus was achieved and, among other things, Congress en-
acted and the President signed into law, the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).4 PURPA was a comprehensive set of
regulations and guidelines designed to apply to both public and private
utilities throughout the nation. Presumably, with this enactment a seri-
ous crisis was averted. But suppose that Congress and the President
had failed to agree upon any specific legislation in this area. And sup-
pose that upon a careful examination of the facts the President cor-
rectly concluded that this moral equivalent of war was being lost and
that the nation was seriously threatened by rapidly dwindling energy
supplies. Could the President have declared that under his authority as
Chief Executive the policies and regulations that would have been em-
bodied in PURPA were, despite the lack of affirmative congressional
action, the law of the land? Certainly, this assertion of authority would
come within the national government's power over interstate com-
merce.5 But would the unilateral exercise of that power by the Presi-
dent have been constitutional? Both instinctual reaction and Supreme
Court precedent suggest a negative answer.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6 provides ample gui-
dance. Just prior to the commencement of a nationwide steel strike,
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the na-
tion's steel mills. Truman believed that the strike would seriously jeop-
ardize the war effort in Korea. The mill owners immediately sought an
injunction. They argued "that the President's order amounts to law-
making, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly
3. J. CARTER, KEEPING FAITH 91 (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
5. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
6. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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conferred upon Congress and not the President."7 In fact, the Govern-
ment did not claim that the President's order was authorized by any
legislation. Rather, the Government argued that the President's
action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which
would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production,
and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was
acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the
Nation's Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States.
Since the parties agreed that no act of Congress had authorized the
action taken by the President, the sole question for the Court was
whether the Constitution did. The Court rejected outright the govern-
ment's reliance on inherent powers of the Commander-in-Chief. The
decision of whether to permit such a taking of private property was a
"job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities." 9 At a
later point in the opinion, the Court made it quite clear that Congress
would have had ample authority to permit the seizure. 10 In so doing,
the Court underscored its rejection of Truman's unilateral exercise of
war power.
The Court similarly rejected the Government's argument that the
vesting of "the executive power" in the President supported the seizure.
The Court stated,
[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea
that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his func-
tions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.I I
That the President had overstepped those bounds here was evident.
The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes,
sets out reasons why the President believes certain policies
should be adopted, proclaims these policies as rules of con-
duct to be followed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a
government official to promulgate additional rules and regu-
lations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to
carry that policy into execution.
1 2
7. 343 U.S. at 582.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 587.
10. Id. at 588.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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The Court held that this lawmaking role assumed by the President was
one to be performed by "Congress alone in both good and bad
times."' 13 An emergency did not alter the scheme of separation of
powers.
Importantly, the duties and responsibilities vested in the national
government were not dispersed among the three branches in a haphaz-
ard manner. The placement of authority in a particular branch was
done consonant with the republican philosophy that animated the
framers of the Constitution. A key aspect of Youngstown is its recogni-
tion of Congress as the repository of lawmaking power. As an abstract
proposition, that observation seems all too obvious; but it nonetheless
signifies an essential aspect of our constitutional system. At the very
heart of republican philosophy is the concept of self governance. Con-
sistent with this philosophy, the framers of the Constitution adopted a
form of government in which the most representative branch, Con-
gress, would be empowered to create the laws and policies to be ad-
vanced by the young nation. The history of the British Constitution
was in general a movement away from monarchy and autocracy and
toward representative government.'4 The framers saw the government
they designed as a further step in that progression, a grand experiment
in representative democracy.' 5 To place the lawmaking authority in
either of the other branches would have been anathema to republican-
ism and a clear step backwards. This explains Madison's observation
that, "[in republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates."' 6
It was no mistake, therefore, that the powers granted to the na-
tional government are largely to be found in article I which more spe-
cifically deals with the establishment of Congress. Congress, as a
primary matter, determines when the powers granted will be exercised.
Thus although in terms of immediate result and efficiency, President
Truman's seizure of the steel mills may have been a good or wise public
policy, the precedent of such a usurpation of legislative authority
13. Id. at 589.
14. Seegenerall, D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN: 1485-
1951 (8th ed. 1966); W. STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1979); E.
WADE & A. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1965).
15. See A. KOCH, POWER, MORALS, AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 103-21 (1961).
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966); see also id. No.
48, at 344-45; see generally C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (T. Nugent trans.
1949).
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presented a stark threat to a most basic premise of our system of
government.
Applying Youngstown to the PURPA hypothetical described
above, one must conclude that had Congress failed to enact PURPA,
the President would not have had the authority to impose a PURPA-
like scheme as the law of the land. This is so even though the national
government as a unit would have had the power to implement identical
legislation and even though Congress' failure to enact PURPA would
place the nation in a severe energy crisis. Since the power to legislate is
one plainly vested in Congress, the President's unilateral action would
be a clear usurpation of congressional prerogative; and, as indicated
above, a crisis does not alter the basic framework of our governmental
system. The President's action would violate the principle of separa-
tion of powers and the basic republican philosophy of our government.
It would be a step backwards toward autocracy. As in Youngstown, it
would be the duty of the judicial branch to declare in an appropriate
judicial proceeding that the action taken by the President was
unconstitutional.
III. ALLOCATIONS IN THE WAR MAKING CONTEXT
This basic structural framework should be equally applicable in
the war making context unless some provision in the Constitution or
something about the overall structure of the Constitution can be said to
indicate a contrary allocation. Certainly, these principles would not be
overriddendf the grant of the power over war simply mirrored the grant
of the power over interstate commerce. The lines of authority would be
expected to break down in a similar pattern and for similar reasons. A
decision to embark upon a war or military activity is to be made by the
representative branch. The prosecution of that chosen policy is the re-
sponsibility of the executive branch.
Suppose that the only mention in the Constitution of the powers
over war came in article I, section 8, and read as follows, "Congress
shall have the power to make war." This, quite plainly, would place
the power to make war in the national government. It would not,
under our theory of government, place the entire power in Congress.
Even more clearly, the power would not be placed solely in the Presi-
dent. Rather, as outlined above, such a grant of power would place
only the legislative authority over the war powers in Congress. Pre-
sumably, executive and judicial authority over this important power
would reflect a pattern consistent with the allocation found under the
commerce clause.
[Vol. 17
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In short, Congress' power to make war would be treated no differ-
ently in terms of lines of authority than Congress' power to regulate
commerce among the states. Congress would have the primary respon-
sibility for determining when and how the war power would be exer-
cised. The ability of the executive branch to exercise its constitutional
authority over this power would derive from action taken by Congress.
In the absence of congressional action, the executive authority would
lie dormant. Of course, Congress would be required to respect the con-
stitutional prerogatives of the executive branch in the prosecution of a
national war policy; and, the judiciary would play constitutional refe-
ree to the extent that one branch undermined the other's constitutional
authority. However, unquestionably, Congress would be the predomi-
nant branch with respect to the nation's power to make war. Under
this model, applying Youngstown, if Congress refused to authorize our
entry into a war or some lesser military skirmish, the President could
not override that decision regardless of the perceived necessity. Execu-
tive authority could be exercised only pursuant to congressional
authorization.
Such a framework of war power authority may be objected to for
its failure to account for the complexity and urgency of the national
defense. Certainly, the nation's need to defend itself against sudden
attack or imminent security risks cannot be held hostage to a structure
that effectively disarms the nation in emergency situations. In an age
of terrorism, world wide aggression and nuclear threat, a world power
such as the United States must have the flexibility to protect its vital
interests. Only the executive branch with its relative efficiency can ef-
fectively shoulder this responsibility. To place such responsibility in a
deliberative body, separated into two houses, would be tantamount to
disarming the nation. In this narrow sphere of activity efficiency and
effectiveness must take precedence over principles of representative de-
mocracy. To conclude otherwise, would place our constitutional sys-
tem at the mercy of foreign powers insensitive to the fine tunings of our
Constitution. These are weighty objections that must be satisfactorily
accommodated. Even a government based on lofty theory must survive
in a non-theoretical world.
Of course, the Constitution is somewhat more specific than the hy-
pothetical grant of power quoted above. But only somewhat. A draft
of the Constitution considered by the Committee of Detail of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787 contained the following grant of power to
1984]
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Congress: "To make war and raise armies & equip Fleets."' 7 The doc-
ument was in the handwriting of Edmund Randolph with emendations
by John Rutledge. It also contained a significant grant of power to the
proposed executive branch: "to command and superintend the militia,
to be Commander in Chief of the Land & Naval Forces of the Union &
of the Militia of the sevl. states." '18 Even at this early drafting stage, the
framers recognized that there was something special about the national
war power that would require specific attention with respect to the sep-
aration of powers. The mere grant of the executive power to the Presi-
dent did not adequately describe the authority of the President in the
war making context. But, equally important, the drafters of this docu-
ment were not satisfied with merely giving Congress a generalized
power to make war. Specific authority is given with respect to the rais-
ing of armies and fleets. The Constitution as finally adopted followed
this somewhat more precise approach. The inquiry, therefore, must fo-
cus more narrowly upon specific allocations of war making power
found in the Constitution and the extent to which those allocations re-
vise or reaffirm the general separation of powers principle.
We begin with article I, section 8 of the Constitution which pro-
vides that
Congress shall have Power. . . To raise and support Ar-
mies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for
a longer Term than two Years. . .; To provide and maintain
a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions; [and] to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States .... 19
Of course, this language cannot be construed as granting Congress the
exclusive power over these matters. The power is vested in the national
government. Congress is given the legislative or lawmaking authority.
But, as indicated earlier, in our republican form of government, that
legislative authority is quite significant. In essence, it is a trigger device
that must be activated before national power can be exercised.
The practical power and responsibility vested in Congress by these
17. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 137 n.6,
143 (rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as FARRAND].
18. Id. at 145.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
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clauses is quite extensive. The power is one to create and regulate
armed forces. Hence, Congress must make the initial determination of
whether-or the extent to which-we should have any armed forces
and, it would seem, the general uses to which those forces may be ap-
plied. The power is, after all, to raise, govern and regulate. The Presi-
dent may participate in this determination through the executive
branch's enormous powers of persuasion and, negatively and less effec-
tively, through the exercise of the veto. In other respects, the executive
power arises only upon affirmative action taken by Congress. If Con-
gress fails to act affirmatively, the President lacks the constitutional
wherewithal to raise his own army or navy. He also lacks the general
authority to use authorized forces in a manner inconsistent with spe-
cific congressional determinations."° To conclude otherwise would be
to permit the President to assume an authority plainly reposed by the
Constitution in Congress; it would permit him to treat as law that
which Congress has failed to enact.
In The Federalist Nos. 24 and 26, Alexander Hamilton discussed
the significance of the legislative power over the armed forces under the
proposed Constitution. He was responding to charges that the Consti-
tution was deficient in that it permitted the national government to
keep troops in time of peace and in that it vested the executive with
plenary power to levy troops. Hamilton refuted the first charge on pol-
icy grounds-the need for some military establishment being a practi-
cal necessity-and the second by demonstrating that the Constitution
vested no such authority in the executive. With respect to the second,
Hamilton noted that the power to raise armies under the Constitution
was lodged in the legislative branch, a branch whose composition
would be controlled by the electorate. Moreover, even that branch
would have significant restraints placed upon it.
[T]hat the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the
Legislature, not in the Executive; that this legislature was to
be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the
people periodically elected; and that . . . there was to be
found. . . an important qualification even of the legislative
discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropriation of
money for the support of an army for any longer period than
two years-a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will
appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up
of troops without evident necessity.
2'
20. But see infra notes 28-37, 120-23 and accompanying text.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1966).
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The requirement that no appropriation for the army would be for a
period of more than two years was, according to Hamilton, designed to
oblige Congress to actively oversee the armed forces and to determine
at regular intervals "the propriety of keeping a military force on
foot."22 Today the appropriations limitation does not operate in the
precise fashion anticipated by Hamilton and the framers of the Consti-
tution.23 As a practical matter, a peacetime standing army of substan-
tial dimensions will be with us for the foreseeable future regardless of
whether the appropriation for those forces be for two years or for some
other time configuration. The appropriations process, however, does
present Congress with the opportunity to express its attitude toward
particular uses to which the armed forces may be put and, accordingly,
to exercise control over those forces. In fact, the spirit of the restraint
22. In THE FEDERALIST No. 26, Hamilton stated:
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this provision, once at
least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military
force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of
the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at liberty
to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if
they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a
confidence.
Id. at 216. See also FARRAND, supra note 17, at 326-27, 330.
23. Apropos of this, an interesting and disturbing dialogue between Professor Alexander
Bickel and Reps. Mallison, Fountain and Fascell took place during hearings on the pro-
posed War Powers Resolution:
Mr. Mallison. It seems to me we are underestimating the role of the House in
providing indispensable funds for the Executive decisions and the carrying out of
treaties.
Mr. Fountain. Gentlemen, they keep enough money in the pipeline to keep
on running several years, regardless of what we do.
Mr. Bickel. In that case you are violating the provisions of the Constitution,
which limit you to 2 years in military appropriations.
Mr. Fountain. What I am referring to is money carried over year after year.
I understand there are billions in the pipeline for military purposes right now.
Mr. Bickel. It does violate the provision limiting it to 2 years.
Mr. Fascell. You have a I-year limitation in each appropriation bill. That
satisfies the constitutional requirement.
Mr. Bickel. Not if you circumvent it by giving the President free funds to
raise and support armies, which he can spend over a longer period than 2 years.
Mr. Fascell. The Constitution does not say spending money. It does not
have a limitation of the time within which the money should be spent.
Mr. Bickel. They must have meant that you should so order affairs that the
President does not really have at his disposal what the British Crown used to have
before the Parliament rose up against it; namely, unlimited funds to spend on a
standing army to wage war.
Mr. Fascell. That is exactly what Presidents have had ever since there has
been a Congress.
Mr. Bickel. I think that runs counter to the only intent that I can divine in
that constitutional clause.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security Policy & Scient#fc Developments of the
House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1970).
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and the role it was intended to play in the structure of authority over
military affairs is no less significant today than it was in 1787. It indi-
cates a strong constitutional sense that Congress is to retain primary
jurisdiction over the armed forces and to be a constant watchdog of
military activity.
For Hamilton, the essence of liberty was in popular control over
the armed forces through the representative branch. And the proposed
Constitution embodied the wisdom and necessity of popular control as
a reflection of historical experience.
[I]t was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the
Prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English
liberty was completely triumphant. As incident to the unde-
fined power of making war, an acknowledged prerogative of
the crown, Charles II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot
in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular troops. And this
number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid out of
his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of so
dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of
Rights then framed, that 'the raising or keeping a standing
army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with the con-
sent of Parliament, was against law.'
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its
highest pitch, no security against the danger of standing ar-
mies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their be-
ing raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive
magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable
revolution, were too temperate, too well-informed, to think of
any restraint on the legislative discretion. They were aware
that a certain number of troops for guards and garrisons were
indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the na-
tional exigencies; that a power equal to every possible contin-
gency must exist somewhere in the government: and that
when they referred the exercise of that power to the judgment
of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of
precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the
COmmunity.
24
In short, the only valid objection to a standing army arose in the con-
text of autocratic control over the military establishment. Our Consti-
tution, Hamilton explained, reflected the lessons of history and was
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 214-15 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1966).
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specifically designed to prevent such a dangerous accumulation of
power in any individual. Certainly our executive branch would not be
vested with such authority. In fact, the Constitution was specifically
designed to ensure that control over the military would be retained by
the representative branch and ultimately by the people. 25
In a passage fraught with irony for contemporary readers, Hamil-
ton disparaged the notion that the elected representatives of the people
could successfully undermine this carefully structured system of consti-
tutional authority and obligation.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community re-
quire time to mature them for execution. An army, so large as
seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by
progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely
a temporary combination between the legislature and execu-
tive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it
probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it
probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted
along through all the successive variations in a representative
body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in
both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he
took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representa-
tives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his
country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found
one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspir-
acy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of
their danger?2 6
These observations indicate a firm constitutional sense of the responsi-
bilities of Congress. In Hamilton's view, only a traitor to our republi-
can system of government would tolerate such an abdication of that
responsibility.
Article I, section 8 contains another significant grant of authority
to Congress: "Congress shall have the Power . . . To declare War
.... " Indeed, this power has been the focal point of much of the
debate regarding the war power. The issues have ranged from whether
a particular conflict is a war within the technical meaning of the clause
25. See Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHi.-KErNTr L.
REv. 131, 132 (1971) (The framers, "authorized Congress to 'raise and support Armies,' and
then tried to ensure that the exclusive power of Congress would be jealously guarded, by
providing that no appropriation of money to raise and support armies 'shall be for a longer
Term than two Years.' ") [hereinafter cited as Bickel].
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 217 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1966).
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or whether a particular action taken by Congress amounts to the re-
quired declaration to the larger question of whether declarations of war
are outmoded in the modem world.27 Such inquiries are not without
their validity, but they overlook a fundamental structural question.
Before attempting to ascertain microscopically the meaning of a single
phrase found in the Constitution, one ought to consider the manner in
which that phrase fits into the overall constitutional scheme. In this
instance, the question is whether the grant to Congress of the power to
declare war alters or affirms the basic principle of separation of powers,
a principle which gives Congress the predominant lawmaking role in
our government. In fact, it plainly affirms that principle. If anything it
underscores the proposition that Congress has the initial authority to
determine the military policy to be prosecuted by this nation through
the executive branch. The power to declare war, when coupled with
other authorities vested in Congress and when viewed as a component
of basic constitutional structure, makes it clear that the authority of
Congress in this regard covers a broad spectrum, from the creation and
regulation of the armed forces through any decision to embark upon
sustained hostilities. This is not to suggest that congressional authority
arises only at the endpoints of the spectrum. Rather, consistent with
the separation of powers principle, the authority of Congress encom-
passes both the endpoints and the vast territory in between.
A more specific understanding of the "declare war" language de-
rives from an examination of the authority of the President over the
national war making power. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution
states: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . ." The
purpose of vesting this authority in the President was primarily to
avoid some of the pitfalls that had arisen during the Revolutionary
War when, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had exer-
cised "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war."2 Congress as a deliberative body had proven itself to be an
entirely unsatisfactory vehicle for the day-to-day prosecution of war.
That failing was remedied in the Constitution by placing the authority
to prosecute war in the executive branch, the arm of the national gov-
ernment uniquely suited to that purpose:
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction
27. See, e.g., Wallace, The War-Making Powers: A ConstitutionalFlaw?, 57 CORNELL L.
REv. 719, 741-44 (1972).
28. ARICLES OF CONFEDERATiON art. IX.
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of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distin-
guish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of
war implies the direction of the common strength; and the
power of directing and employing the common strength,
forms a usual and essential part in the definition of executive
authority.
29
This power to direct the war effort did not, however, vest the President
with the constitutional authority to override the more pervasive author-
ities of Congress. Again, turning to Hamilton,
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would
be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain,
but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to noth-
ing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the
Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the de-
claring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies-all which, by the Constitution under consideration,
would appertain to the legislature.3
Thus, the Commander-in-Chief's authority, although created by the
Constitution, derives its power from congressional will. Without Con-
gress, the President would have neither the forces with which to operate
nor, assuming forces had been supplied, the authorization to use those
forces.
This brings us to the question of whether the President may ever
exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief in the absence of specific
congressional authorization (assuming that Congress has provided the
President with a standing army). The general answer is that he may
not. However, general propositions must give way to more particular
circumstances.
Initial drafts of the Constitution had given Congress the power to
"make war." On the motion of James Madison and Elbridge Gerry,
however, that language was altered to give Congress the power to "de-
clare war." The purpose, according to Madison's notes, was to make
clear that the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, would
have the authority to repel sudden attacks upon the nation.3' The pub-
29. Id No. 74, at 473.
30. Id No. 69, at 446.
31. FARRAND, supra note 17, at 318-19 ("Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry moved to insert
'declare,' striking out 'make' war, leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
attacks.").
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lished records of the Federal Convention of 1787 indicate that the
adopted language was not meant to dilute congressional power, but
rather was a recognition of a special instance of Executive competence
to represent the interests of the nation.32 Just as a deliberative body
cannot effectively conduct a war, it cannot make quick and precise de-
cisions with respect to sudden attacks. In this sense, the power to repel
sudden attacks is not an exception to the overall separation of powers
framework. It is a responsible recognition of the relative functions of
each branch.33
In fact, the Madison and Gerry motion was made in part as a re-
sponse to a suggestion by Pierce Butler that the entire power to make
war be vested in the President.34 Speaking to this suggestion, Gerry
observed that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the Executive alone to declare war."35 Similarly, George Ma-
son stated that he "was agst [sic] giving the power of war to the Execu-
tive because not [safely] to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because
not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather
than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. ''3 6 There is no record of
any support for the Butler position. In adopting the Madison and
Gerry motion, the framers plainly rejected Butler's suggestion of broad
executive war making authority. They did, of course, recognize that
the President's power to conduct war included the authority to repel
sudden attacks. But nothing in this reasonable deference to Executive
competence indicates an intent to alter the basic roles of the legislative
and executive branches.37
Thus, article I of the Constitution grants a substantial array of
32. According to Madison's notes, the initial vote on the motion was seven ayes, two
noes and one absent, Connecticut being one of the no votes. However, "[o]n the remark by
Mr. King that 'make' war might be understood to 'conduct' it which was an Executive func-
tion, Mr. Elseworth gave up his objection (and the vote of Cont was changed to-ay.)" 2
FARRAND, supra note 17, at 319 n.*. The records of the Journal of the Convention, however,
present a slightly different picture. The Journal indicates that although the final vote was, as
Madison indicated, an eight to one approval, the initial vote was four to five against the
motion. Under that scenario, the "remark by Mr. King" places a significant interpretive
gloss on the meaning of the adopted language. Id., at 313-14; 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at xii-xiv, xvi-xvii (discussing the relative accuracy
of the notes of the Journal and the notes of Madison).
33. See Bickel, supra note 25, at 132.
34. FARRAND, supra note 17, at 318.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 319. See also id. (statement of Mr. Elseworth).
37. See also A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 3-6 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as SCHLESINGER]; Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 675-77 (1972).
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powers to the national government. Among those powers are the
power to regulate interstate commerce and the power to make war or
engage in military conflict. Congress is vested with the primary author-
ity to determine whether and, if so, under what circumstances those
powers are to be exercised. Article II of the Constitution establishes the
President's authority and duty to execute the lawfully enacted will of
Congress. It also establishes the President's role as Commander-in-
Chief. And although the Constitution treats the war powers somewhat
more precisely than it does the power over interstate commerce, noth-
ing in that treatment indicates a constitutional intent to alter the basic
separation of powers scheme. In fact, if anything, the primary author-
ity and responsibility of Congress is underscored in the war making
context by the detailed specification of congressional authority and re-
sponsibilities found in the Constitution. This is not surprising in light
of the grave threat to liberty presented by the power to make war. One
would expect a republic to carefully supervise such a dangerous power
and its attendant weapons of destruction. It is also not surprising that
the Constitution vests in the President as Commander-in-Chief the au-
thority and responsibility to defend the nation against sudden attacks.
Such a task is, like the conduct of war itself, beyond the competence of
a deliberative body and necessary to the preservation of the nation.
This is the basic separation of powers framework. The primacy of
Congress is established while at the same time the need for a central-
ized executive branch is recognized. The constitutional structure is,
however, not rigid. For example, while the Constitution vests the Pres-
ident with the authority to use military force to repel sudden attacks,
i.e., to defend the nation in emergency situations, there is no precise
definition of what those circumstances might entail. Political consider-
ations may define the boundaries of that discretion. Nor does the Con-
stitution specifically define the constitutional responsibility of Congress
with respect to the execution of its authority over the armed forces.
Some delegation is required unless Congress is to oversee the day to
day operations of the military, but some substantial oversight must re-
main if Congress is to carry out its assigned task in the constitutional
structure. There is no bright line. Separation of powers describes a
framework from which a philosophy of representative government
might successfully function. It does not provide a precise roadmap to
that end. As a consequence, the separations are less lines of demarca-
tion than indications of spheres of primary competence and jurisdic-
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tion. To the extent lines exist, they are fluid. A certain amount of give
and take is expected.38
Because of this fluidity, this give and take, there is a great potential
for conflict among the branches. As one branch attempts to stretch its
line of authority and the others resist, a certain amount of friction must
arise. This friction is an inevitable and healthy by-product of the sepa-
ration of powers.
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by
the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to pre-
clude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to
avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident
to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.
39
It has been observed that in the arena of foreign affairs, of which the
war making power is an aspect, the potential for friction is particularly
great. Edward S. Corwin described the Constitution as "an invitation
to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." 4
This was no happenstance. So long as the struggle continues and the
combatants remain in rough parity of constitutional authority, minor
deviations from strict lines of authority are both acceptable and inevi-
table. The government would cease to function if each branch insisted
upon its full range of constitutional prerogatives. But when the strug-
gle for authority ceases, when the friction dissipates, the threat to our
system of government becomes acute. Here, the Constitution's primary
structural protection of liberty breaks down as one branch takes on the
gloss and accoutrements of an autocracy.
Quite plainly, to be effective, the principle of separation of powers
requires that each branch accept, and exercise when appropriate, the
constitutional authority imposed upon it. It requires that each branch
sensibly protect its constitutionally mandated role within our system of
government. Indeed, it is the constitutional responsibility of each
branch to reasonably defend its constitutional -prerogative from en-
38. Chief Justice John Marshall's observation in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819), is apropos:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be em-
braced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public.
Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those ob-
jects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.
Id. at 407.
39. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. E. CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENr: OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (1940).
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croachment or desuetude. This is, in a sense, a constitutional trust we
place in the members of each branch. To the extent that this responsi-
bility is evaded, a vacuum of authority is created. Vacuums of political
power do not long remain empty. Certainly if external pressures de-
mand a governmental response and none is forthcoming from the con-
stitutionally appropriate sector, it would not be surprising to see the
solution achieved in other quarters. Indeed, under certain circum-
stances the other branches may feel compelled to fill the void.41 Cer-
tainly, with respect to the national defense, it would not be surprising
for the President to take strong initiatives when confronted with a rela-
tively complacent Congress. This perceived proclivity of the executive
was one of the reasons for placing the war making power primarily in
Congress. "The constitution supposes, what the History of all Govts
demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in
war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested
the question of war in the Legisl.
' '4 2
IV. DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Madison's observation regarding the executive branch's proclivity
toward war has been verified by practice under our Constitution. De-
spite the clear framework of congressional predominance ordained by
the Constitution, primary authority over the war power has shifted
from that representative body to the executive branch. The transfer of
authority was not abrupt, but instead occurred through a lengthy pro-
cess of evolution that picked up pace as the United States emerged in
the twentieth century as a recognized world power. The shift was not
inevitable; that it has taken place is, however, undeniable.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unilateral exer-
cises of the war power by the executive branch were relatively trivial
and largely inconsequential in terms of their effect upon our overall
political structure.43 Presidents did take action to suppress piracy, the
American slave trade and the like, but beyond this, deference to Con-
gress in larger scale conflicts was the rule rather than the exception. 44
41. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), seems to have been an example of this
phenomenon.
42. Letter from Madison to Jefferson, April 2, 1978, reprinted in VI MADISON, WRITINGS
312-13 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
43. S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-12 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
797]; SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 51.
44. With respect to the nineteenth century, S. REP. No. 797, supra note 43, states:
This dividing line between the proper spheres of legislative and executive au-
thority was sufficiently flexible to permit the President to use military force in the
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Of course, deference comes in degrees and some nineteenth century
administrations took a broad, potentially unconstitutional, view of
presidential prerogative. President Polk's military intervention into the
territorial dispute between Mexico and the then sovereign nation of
Texas certainly fits into this category. 45 To a similar effect is Grant's
naval intervention in the war between Santo Domingo and Haiti.4 6 On
the other hand, a number of eighteenth and nineteenth century Presi-
dents scrupulously adhered to the model designed by the framers.
Presidents Adams and Jefferson were quite reticent to tread upon the
war making authority of Congress.47 Jefferson's reluctance to take of-
fensive military action against the Bey of Tripoli is one such example.48
Presidents Buchanan and Cleveland were of a similar strict construc-
tionist frame of mind.49 In any event, notwithstanding sporadic exam-
unimportant cases, while preserving the role of Congress in important decisions.
The acts of war doctrine was probably a step beyond what the framers intended
when they changed the congressional power from "make" war to "declare" war,
and was certainly a move in the direction of Presidential power compared to the
cautious stance of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Madison. The central ob-
jective which the Constitution sought-congressional authority to approve the ini-
tiation of major conflicts-was undamaged, but a certain fraying of the edges had
occurred. This slight deterioration was greatly accelerated during the following 50
years.
Id. at 11-12 (quoting Russell, The United States Congress and the Power to Use Military
Force Abroad, FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY 242-43 (1967)).
45. Commenting on the Mexican War in a letter to William Herndon, then Congress-
man Abraham Lincoln stated, "Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, when-
ever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion. . . and you allow him to make war at
pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect. .. ." 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451 (R. Basler ed. 1953). Lincoln went on to
explain that under the Constitution, "no one man" was granted such a power. Id. at 452.
Lincoln took a much broader view of presidential prerogative during the Civil War. See
SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 61-67. But neither the Congress with its Committee on the
Conduct of the War nor the Supreme Court, see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866), was willing to accede to his philosophy. In any event, Lincoln as President faced a
domestic insurrection, not a foreign war. Thus regardless of the merits of his position, it
presents a constitutional issue of a different sort.
46. SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 78. Stung by congressional rebuke of his order,
Grant reassessed his philosophy of presidential prerogative in subsequent exercises of the
war power. Id.
47. A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS
139-47, 196-227 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SOFAER]; SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 22-23.
48. See D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM 97-99 (1970); but see
SOFAER, supra note 47, at 214-15 (suggesting that Jefferson's report to Congress on this inci-
dent was somewhat disingenuous).
49. See P. KLEIN, PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN 183-90, 319, 321-25, 335-40 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as KLEIN]; A. NEVINs, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN COURAGE 549-
62, 629-48, 713-22 (1932); see generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 56-57, 78. Klein
described Buchanan's presidential philosophy as follows:
Buchanan considered the presidential office not as a place of leadership but as
a post of executive agency. The president should faithfully implement and enforce
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ples of presidential war making during these formative years, as the
nation entered the twentieth century, the constitutional model was basi-
cally intact, albeit somewhat bruised.5
The turn of the century marked a clear shift in presidential atti-
tude. A tone of presidential prerogative was established quite early
when, in 1900, President McKinley, without congressional authoriza-
tion, deployed 5000 troops to China to aid in suppressing the Boxer
rebellion." Subsequent administrations drew upon this example. Both
in act and word, Theodore Roosevelt marked broad boundaries for
presidential initiative in the war making sphere 2.5  Both Taft and Wil-
son followed suit, each deploying United States Armed Forces in the
Carribean and Central America as unilateral exercises of presidential
power.5 3
None of these Presidents claimed an inherent power to make war
beyond the power to repel sudden attacks, but subtle theories of "in-
terposition" and "intervention" were created to justify a broad range of
presidential military action. 4 With respect to technical war, Wilson
the policies defined by deliberative bodies: the party convention, the Congress of
the United States, and the federal courts. He should shoulder the responsibility not
of invention but of action; he should not initiate policy but execute it with skill and
efficiency.
KLEIN, supra, at 313. This philosophy applied to the war power. Id at 337. Buchanan's
position is remarkable in that he advocated an active United States involvement in the af-
fairs of Mexico and Central America. In the absence of congressional authorization, he
declined to implement that policy other than through diplomacy. Id at 335-40.
50. See supra note 44.
51. SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 88-89.
52. See H. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 279-314 (1931) [hereinafter cited as PRIN-
GLE ON ROosEvELT]; SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 88-90, 308. Just prior to leaving office,
Roosevelt wrote, "[t]he biggest matters, such as the Portsmouth peace, the acquisition of
Panama, and sending the fleet around the world, I managed without consultation with any-
one; for when a matter is of capital importance, it is well to have it handled by one man
only." VI ROOSEVELT, LETTERS 1497-98 (S. Morison ed. 1951-56). In addition, Pringle
quotes Roosevelt as having written, "I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the
use of executive power." PRINGLE ON ROOSEVELT, supra, at 254.
53. See 2 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 678-99 (1939);
S. REP. No. 797, supra note 43, at 12-13; SCHLESINGER, supra note 37, at 89-91, 137, 286; see
general, W. SCHOLES & M. SCHOLES, THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE TAFT ADMINISTRA-
TION (1970); E. ROBINSON & V. WEST, THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WOODROW WILSON (1917);
P. CARTER, CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC REACTION TO WILSON'S CARIBBEAN POLICY,
1913-1917 (1977).
54. See THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES BY LANDING FORCES (3d rev. ed. 1933). Originally published in 1912, this memoran-
dum draws a distinction between military intervention into the affairs of a foreign sovereign
and the interposition of United States Armed Forces into a foreign nation for the purposes
of protecting American lives and property. With respect to the latter, the memorandum
concludes that the landing of United States Armed Forces for such purposes is not an act of
war. Id. at 38-40. Therefore such an act may be accompL*.hed without a declaration of war.
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did acknowledge that Congress alone possessed the constitutional au-
thority to place this nation into protracted or sustained hostilities with
foreign sovereigns. In his message to Congress on April 2, 1917, re-
questing a declaration of war upon Germany, he stated, "I have called
the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very
serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it
is neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume
the responsibility of making."55 Nonetheless, the overall model of these
administrations was of increasing presidential war making authority.
President Franklin Roosevelt followed and arguably expanded
upon the model provided by his early twentieth century counterparts. 6
His undeclared naval war in the Atlantic was an unabashed exercise of
raw power, not easily distinguished from Polk's unconstitutional ad-
venturism at the Rio Grande, except perhaps on grounds of pure expe-
diency. Moreover, it is no secret that long before we entered World
War II, this nation, largely through efforts emanating from the White
House, had become closely allied to the British war effort. And while
Roosevelt plainly recognized that hostilities on a larger scale required
the political support of Congress, he was willing to extend his authority
as Commander-in-Chief (for example, the "destroyers for bases" deal)
to ensure that Britain survived to the day that political consensus could
be achieved.
Presidential war making authority was pushed a step further and
elevated to a constitutional principle during the Administration of
President Truman through its prosecution of the Korean War. Truman
committed United States troops to that conflict without congressional
authorization based on the theory that "the President, as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over
the use thereof."57 Congress was seemingly out of the picture.
Moreover, "it is not believed that Congress may, merely because it is authorized to declare
war against a foreign country, be considered as possessing the power to direct the President
in the employment of forces in operations not amounting to war against a foreign country."
Id. at 40. In essence, the memorandum propounded the theory that the President has an
inherent power to use military force abroad except in circumstances that would require a
declaration of war. This interpretation of the Constitution ignores completely the basic con-
stitutional structure including article I's specific grant of the legislative power to Congress.
See supra text accompanying notes 3-16. Moreover, it mistakes a substantive grant of power
to the national government-the power to make war-as a narrow grant of authority to
Congress.
55. PRESIDENT WILSON'S STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 372-73 (Review of Reviews
Co. ed. 1918).
56. See J. BURNS, THE LION AND THE Fox 437-42, 457-61 (1956); SCHLESINrER,supra
note 37, at 105-09, 113-16; S. RP. No. 797, supra note 43, at 13.
57. 23 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173 (1950).
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The breadth of the Commander-in-Chief power as envisioned by
the Truman Administration was described by then Secretary of State
Dean Acheson:
Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed
Forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United
States and implementing treaties, but it is equally clear that
this authority may not be interfered with by the Congress in
the exercise of powers which it has under the Constitution.5"
With respect to allocations of constitutional authority, Secretary Ache-
son admonished that "[w]e are in a position in the world today where
the argument as to who has the power to do this, that, or the other
thing, is not exactly what is called for from America in this very critical
hour."59
These were bold and pivotal assertions by the executive branch.
As Senator Robert Taft correctly, but fruitlessly observed, "The Presi-
dent simply usurped authority, in violation of the laws and the Consti-
tution, when he sent troops .to Korea to carry out the resolution of the
United Nations in an undeclared war."60 Indeed, this was the same
unilateral authority that had been repudiated by the Supreme Court in
the context of the Youngstown case. But congressional inaction in the
face of this usurpation politically legitimized the precedent as well as
the theory that the Commander-in-Chief power gave the President an
independent basis to make war.
Congressional willingness to defer to the executive branch in mat-
ters relating to war reached its nadir in 1964 with the passage of the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This event and its aftermath must be ex-
amined closely since together they provided an important prelude to
the adoption of the War Powers Resolution.
V. THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
On August 2 and 5 of 1964, the Department of Defense reported
attacks by North Vietnamese PT boats upon two United States destroy-
ers thirty miles off the coast of North Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Based on these incidents, the Administration immediately sought from
Congress authorization to engage in direct military action against
North Vietnam. The request came in the form of a resolution, now
58. Assignment of Ground Forces in European Area: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations & Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1951) (Statement of Dean
Acheson, Secretary of State).
59. Id at 93 (testimony of Dean Acheson, Secretary of State).
60. 97 CONG. REc. 57 (1951).
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known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, that had been drafted by the
Administration some time earlier. It appeared to vest in the President
broad, seemingly unchecked, military authority in Southeast Asia.
Specifically, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution provided:
That Congress approves and supports the determination of
the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national in-
terest and to world peace the maintenance of international
peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the
Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations and in
accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Col-
lective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, pre-
pared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any member or pro-
tocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.6
Supporters of the Resolution recognized the breadth of the authority
being vested in the President, namely, a free hand to make war, but
doubted that the President would use it.
6 2
In fact, the Resolution was merely part of an escalating United
States involvement in the war, much of it unknown to the American
public. For example, beginning in February of 1964, the United States
had been engaged in a concerted program of clandestine military oper-
ations against North Vietnam designed "to result in substantial de-
struction, economic loss and harassment. ' ' 63 These operations, entitled
Operation Plan 34A, included spy flights over North Vietnam, kidnap-
pings of North Vietnamese citizens, infiltration of sabotage and psy-
chological-warfare teams into the North, commando raids on rail and
highway bridges, and bombing of North Vietnamese coastal installa-
tions.64 In fact, the PT boat attacks by the North Vietnamese against
the United States destroyers may have been in response to specific Plan
61. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, §§ 1-2, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
62. 110 CONG. REC. 18,403-04, 18,409 (1964) (statement of Sen. Fulbright); id. at 18,409-
10 (statement of Sen. Cooper); id. at 18,418 (statement of Sen. Javits).
63. THE PENTAGON PAPERS 238 (N.Y. Times ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as THE PENTA-
GON PAPERS] (quoting Report to the President of the United States from Maj. Gen. Victor
H. Krulak of the Marine Corps (Jan. 2, 1964)); See generally DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS 1945-1967 (1971).
64. THE PENTAGON PAPERS, supra note 63, at 238.
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34A raids that had taken place in that vicinity on July 30, 1964.65
The House of Representatives spent approximately eighty minutes
considering the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, both in committee and on
the floor of the House, prior to adopting it by a vote of 416 to 0.66
There is no record of any member speaking against the Resolution,
although one member did express concern for the constitutional impli-
cations of its broad grant of authority.6 The Senate devoted approxi-
mately eight and a half hours to the Resolution and although some
Senators did express their constitutional concerns and even opposition,
the Resolution passed unscathed by a vote of eighty-eight to two.
68
Two days after the second reported incident, Congress had completed
its work. The President signed the Resolution on August 10, 1964.
Considering the breadth of executive authority the Resolution recog-
nized, the haste can only be described as a rush to irresponsibility. In
two days, Congress succeeded in setting the Constitution on its head,
placing in the President a range of powers wholly at odds with our
republican system of government.
Curiously, the administration consistently denied that the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution was a constitutional requisite for the military action
it was taking or planning to take. Congressional support was politically
expedient, but not constitutionally required. 9 Undersecretary of State
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach did argue later, however, that the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution when coupled with the SEATO Treaty was the
"functional equivalent" of a declaration of war.70 He was, as a practi-
cal matter, correct.7 ' And the President used this open ended invitation
65. Id. at 259-61.
66. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4
(Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
67. 110 CONG. REc. 18,553 (1964) (statement of Rep. Alger).
68. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 66, at 4-5. Senator Wayne Morse expressed a dissenting
view with uncanny prescience,
I believe that history will record that we have made a great mistake by sub-
verting and circumventing the Constitution of the United States.. . by means of
this resolution.
As I argued earlier today at some length, we are in effect giving the President
.. . warmaking powers in the absence of a declaration of war.
I believe that to be a historic mistake.
110 CONG. REc. 18,470 (1964).
69. The President's News Conference, 3 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1173, 1176-77
(Aug. 18, 1967); Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam, 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 474, 484, 489 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Meeker]. The Nixon
Administration was of the same view. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 66, at 20-21.
70. S. REP. No. 797, supra note 43, at 22.
71. See Meeker, supra note 69, at 485-88; Van Alstyne, Congress, the President and the
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to make war with a vengeance. The rapid escalation of the war by the
executive branch in 1965 and thereafter is well documented.7" Con-
gress, by failing to act responsibly at the outset, had opened a pandora's
box of unchecked power.
Of course, there is nothing wrong with Congress granting to the
President a mandate to exercise his authority as Chief Executive or
Commander-in-Chief. When the situation calls for it, Congress has the
power and responsibility to do so. This is part of the congressional
lawmaking function. But such grants must be accomplished in a man-
ner that is consistent with the constitutional allocations of war making
authority.73 Delegations of authority are permitted, but only when ac-
companied by standards substantially defining and limiting the policy
making discretion of the executive branch.74
There is something very wrong with Congress handing the Presi-
dent a blanket grant of war making authority to meet unspecified fu-
ture contingencies-and this is precisely what Congress did when it
adopted the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Such a grant is not an active
exercise of constitutional responsibility. It is, rather, an abdication of
the constitutionally mandated duty to fully examine the necessity for
armed conflict and, assuming the necessity arises, to articulate the pol-
icy to be followed by the executive branch.7" That, in any event, was
the role imposed upon Congress by the Constitution.76 Indeed, the re-
sponsibility to make such ultimate policy judgments on war cannot be
delegated to the executive branch without completely ignoring the most
Power to Declare War.A Requiemfor Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19-28 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Van Alstyne].
72. See supra note 62.
73. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legisla-
tive power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.").
74. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-42 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30
(1935). This rule would seem to have particular relevance in the war making context since
the Constitution imposes upon Congress the ultimate responsibility to define and determine
the nation's war making policy. That responsibility cannot be given away without sub-
verting the framework and intent of the Constitution. In short, that responsibility is nondel-
egable. See Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 13-19.
75. In The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813), the
Supreme Court upheld a congressional grant of authority to the President that permitted
him to reactivate certain laws regarding this nation's neutrality upon a finding by him that
certain specific events had occurred. The authority vested in the President was narrowly
drawn to meet a specific contingency and as such could not be said to violate the separation
of powers principle. See also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 682-683 (1892) (discussing The
Aurora and the narrow scope of its holding).
76. See supra notes 17-42 and accompanying text.
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basic tenets of our carefully structured system of government." Such
delegations place in the President powers the Framers specifically and
carefully withheld from that office.
A report issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee aptly
described the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and its implications as
follows:
The Gulf of Tonkin resolution represents the extreme point
in the process of constitutional erosion that began in the first
years of this century. Couched in broad terms, the resolution
constitutes an acknowledgement of virtually unlimited Presi-
dential control of the armed forces. It is of more than histori-
cal importance that the Congress now ask itself why it was
prepared to acquiesce in the transfer to the executive of a
power which, beyond any doubt, was intended by the Consti-
tution to be exercised by Congress.78
Congress never fully recuperated from its failure to shoulder its
constitutionally mandated responsibility during the formative stages of
the Vietnam War. Although prior to the adoption of the War Powers
Resolution there were several efforts in Congress to address the evident
constitutional breakdown, a tone of executive predominance had been
set by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and the initiative remained in
that branch for the duration of the conflict. Included among the efforts
to assert congressional authority were the National Commitments Res-
olution,79 the Cooper-Church Amendment,80 the McGovern-Hatfield
77. As Professor Alexander Bickel stated:
The doctrine that delegation without standards is unconstitutional. . . is no mere
technical teaching. It is concerned. . . with the sources of policy, with the crucial
joinder between power and broadly based democratic responsibility, bestowed and
discharged after the fashion of representative government. Delegation without
standards short-circuits the lines of responsibility that make the political process
meaningful.
Bickel, supra note 25, at 137; see also Van Alstyne, supra note 71, at 13-19.
78. S. REP. No. 797, supra note 43, at 20.
79. Adopted in 1969 by the Senate, the National Commitments Resolution provided:
Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent
years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution
means the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a
promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the armed
forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the
happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national
commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the
executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a
treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically
providing for such commitment.
S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 17,245 (1969).
[Vol. 17
1984] SYMPOSIUM
Resolution,8 and the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.82 None
of these measures significantly altered the pattern of presidential pre-
dominance. The National Commitments Resolution expressed only
the sense of the Senate and, hence, did not have the force of law. It was
virtually ignored by the Nixon Administration-the invasion of Cam-
bodia being a prime example.83 Cooper-Church may have had an effect
upon the administration's political flexibility,84 but even so, Cooper-
Church can be fairly characterized as too little and too late.85 McGov-
em-Hatfield failed to pass.86  And the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution had little practical effect since the Nixon Administration,
both before and after the repeal, disavowed any reliance upon the reso-
lution as support for military activities in Southeast Asia.87 In short,
Congress had been dislodged from a policy making position and placed
80. The Cooper-Church Amendment was a direct response to the invasion of Cambo-
dia. Initial versions of Cooper-Church would have required a pullout of all United States
troops from Cambodia by a date certain, as well as a halt to bombing and any future mili-
tary incursions into Cambodia. Although those measures had substantial support, none
were adopted-in part because action taken by the Nixon Administration indicated an early
withdrawal from Cambodia. A modified version of the Cooper-Church Amendment was
passed by both Houses approximately six months after all United States troops had been
withdrawn from Cambodia. The substance of the provision was the result of negotiations
between Capitol Hill and the White House. It was signed by the President on January 12,
1971 as an amendment to a supplemental foreign assistance bill that provided substantial
military and economic aid to Cambodia. The amendment forbade the President from using
any funds appropriated under the Act or otherwise for the reintroduction of ground combat
troops to Cambodia. It did not preclude United States bombing missions into Cambodia.
In addition, the Administration never conceded that the Amendment would bind the Presi-
dent, if, as Commander-in-Chief, he deemed a second invasion of Cambodia necessary to
protect the troops in Vietnam.
81. See 116 CONG. REc. 30,674 (1970).
82. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971).
83. The Nixon Administration did not seek authorization from Congress for the inva-
sion of Cambodia. Nor did it consult with Congress. The Sen. Foreign Relations Commit-
tee was completely bypassed. In fact, according to Henry Kissinger's account, the only
legislator informed of the plans for the invasion was Senator John Stennis, chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and a staunch supporter of the war. H. KiSSINGER,
WHITE HoUsE YEARS 496 (1979).
84. See id. at 513.
85. See supra note 80. This comment is not meant to disparage the efforts of those who
sponsored Cooper-Church; rather it is a comment on the institutional inability of Congress
to extricate itself from its failure to act responsibly at the outset.
86. 116 CONG. Rc. 30,683 (1970).
87. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 66, at 37, 41. In the view of the Nixon Administration,
the President possessed ample authority as Commander-in-Chief to engage in combat for
the protection of troops in the field and for the protection of prisoners of war, regardless of
whether the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had been a constitutional requisite for the initiation
of the war. Id. Through a bizarre twist of reasoning, the withdrawal of troops, which had
begun under President Johnson, became the basis for a continuing authority to make and
expand the war. Thus, in one very important sense, the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Reso-
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in a reactive posture. Recapturing the ability to control the nation's
war policy would remain elusive.
At the same time Congress was considering the above measures,
the House began hearings on a number of legislative proposals regard-
ing the overall division of war making authority between Congress and
the President."8 The eventual fruit of those hearings and similar hear-
ings in the Senate 9 was the War Powers Resolution of 1973.90 In part,
the War Powers Resolution was a conservative effort to short-circuit
the perceived excesses of Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield. 91
In part, it was a bipartisan effort to express legislatively that which the
Constitution had so plainly articulated. In any event, as finally
adopted-over the veto of President Nixon-the Resolution symbol-
ized for the public a resurgence of congressional willingness to partici-
pate in the exercise of the war power.92
VI. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The War Powers Resolution 93 contains three major substantive
provisions. Section 3 requires consultation by the President with Con-
gress; section 4 requires a presidential report to Congress on specified
deployments of United States Armed Forces; and, section 5 places a
sixty to ninety day limitation on the deployment of armed forces into
hostile zones in the absence of the express consent of Congress. There
lution was constitutionally dangerous. It permitted the war to continue, while at the same
time leaving no congressional authorization whatsoever for that continuance.
88. See Congress, The President, and the War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcom. on
Nat'! Security Policy & Scientyc Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs , 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
89. War Powers Legislation, 1971: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
90. For a legislative history of the War Powers Resolution, see SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 66; Statutory Comment, The War Powers Resolution: Statutory Limitation on the Com-
mander-in-Chief, I1 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 181 (1974).
91. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 66, at 66-67, 75-77.
92. Before examining the War Powers Resolution, a final point must be addressed. It
has been argued that congressional acquiescence in the practice of executive war making has
constitutionally legitimized the model of presidential predominance. See, e.g., Monaghan,
Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. REv. (Special Issue) 19 (1970). If this theory is correct,
then it can only mean that an unconstitutional practice long endured amends the Constitu-
tion for we are not here dealing with anything that can be legitimately described as a grey
area. The theory is without merit. Article V of the Constitution provides a method of
amendment and so long as that method is not used, the Constitution remains unaltered
regardless of any pattern of behavior undertaken by the President, the Congress or the
Supreme Court. There is no doctrine of amendment by violation. Patterns of unconstitu-
tional behavior call for one response-repudiation.
93. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
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is nothing inherently wrong with consultation and reporting, and at
first glance a limitation on deployments into hostile zones would ap-
pear to be a step in the right direction. However, under all of these
provisions, the role of Congress remains precisely where it had been
placed by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution-in a reactive posture. It is
important to note that the War Powers Resolution is not part of a
larger scheme designed to reestablish the predominance of Congress. It
is the single congressional response to the pattern of executive predomi-
nance exemplified by Vietnam. The sufficiency of the Resolution must
be assessed as such.
With respect to consultation, the Resolution provides that the
President shall, "in every possible instance," consult with Congress
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities.
Neither the key terms, "consult," and "hostilities," nor the phrase, "in
every possible instance," are defined, leaving the application of this
provision to the vagaries of political circumstance and presidential cre-
ativity. The decisions of whether and to what extent consultation is
required are to be made by the President. Under some circumstances,
this may mean that key members of Congress will be given an opportu-
nity to participate in policy formulation. Under other circumstances, it
may mean nothing more than a preview of tomorrow's news for a se-
lected few. While the former is certainly preferable, neither can substi-
tute for the constitutionally required congressional control over
exercises of the war power. Clearly, under this section, the dominant
lawmaking role remains in the executive branch. Policy will be formu-
lated there; action will emanate from decisions made there. At best,
consultation operates as a moderate check upon presidential excess.
This is a far cry from the structural role of Congress as the nation's
primary policy making institution.
Of course, the President as Commander-in-Chief has the constitu-
tional authority to act unilaterally in responding to surprise attacks
upon the nation. Under such circumstances, a policy of consultation
when possible would be exemplary even if not constitutionally re-
quired. But aside from that very limited context, the Constitution de-
mands a much larger role for Congress. Legislative obeisance to the
practice of consultation without other incursions into unconstitutional
presidential prerogative exalts the limited constitutional authority of
the Commander-in-Chief above the pervasive war power authorities
vested in Congress by the Constitution. Both in theory and practice the
consultation requirement detracts from the congressional role ordered
1984]
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by the Constitution. It legitimizes a process which places Congress in a
position of institutional inferiority.
The reporting requirements have a similar effect.94 They recog-
nize an executive authority to order deployments of United States
armed forces over a broad spectrum of situations, an authority which
goes well beyond the emergency powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
Moreover, nothing in the Resolution imposes upon Congress a duty to
participate in decisions leading up to these deployments. Yet, the Con-
stitution expressly places on Congress the duty to raise, regulate and
govern the armed forces. Surely this grant of authority requires Con-
gress to be actively involved in such basic strategic decisions as the
placement of American armed forces throughout the globe.
The President's authority as Commander-in-Chief was not
designed to override the primary responsibilities of Congress. Rather
that authority was designed so that the will of Congress would be effi-
ciently and effectively prosecuted. 95 To be sure, some delegation of
congressional authority to the President would be appropriate. Con-
gress cannot be expected to supervise day-to-day operations of the
armed forces. But presumably any such delegation would be accompa-
nied by defined standards and accomplished through provision of a rel-
atively constant network of congressional oversight.96 The War Powers
Resolution envisions a framework under which the President has broad
discretion to use the United States Armed Forces as tools of his foreign
policy subject to a reporting requirement that will permit Congress to
94. Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution provides in part:
(a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostili-
ties is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped
for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, re-
pair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, set-
ting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed
Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduc-
tion took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1543.
95. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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attempt, when politically feasible, to pour spilled milk back into a
bottle.
The deficiencies of the consultation and reporting requirements
pale when compared to the constitutional give-away created by section
5. The War Powers Resolution provides that whenever the President
introduces United States Armed Forces "into hostilities, or into situa-
tions where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances," he must terminate the use of those forces within
sixty days "unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces,
(2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically un-
able to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States."
97
The primary constitutional obstacle to this provision is not, as Presi-
dent Nixon argued in his veto message, that it unconstitutionally limits
the power of the Commander-in-Chief.9 Rather the key deficiency of
section 5(b) is that it gives the President a legislative blank check to
deploy United States Armed Forces into combat situations without the
specific consent of Congress.
This grant ventures well beyond the constitutional powers of the
Commander-in-Chief to repel sudden attacks. It permits invasions of
foreign sovereigns whenever deemed by the President to be expedient.
The only qualification upon the grant is that the military activity cease
within sixty days unless Congress approves a continuation of hostilities
beyond that time frame. Again, the War Powers Resolution places
Congress in an inferior position. The President initiates hostilities and
Congress may either validate the action taken or embark upon an un-
likely and largely unworkable effort to extricate the forces from battle.
Common experience dictates that in the context of military action such
a position is relatively ineffective in light of the vast seductive powers
of presidential action in the military sphere. During the entire prosecu-
tion of the Vietnam War, Congress was unable to make any substantial
inroads into presidential prerogative. Once troops are committed to
battle, the die of war is, for all practical purposes, cast. Only in the
most rare of situations could Congress successfully challenge the Com-
mander-in-Chief power unleashed. George Mason stated at the Fed-
97. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544. Section 5(b) also
provides a 30 day extention upon certification by the President "that unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of
such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." Id.
98. Veto of War Powers Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PR.s. Doc. 1285, 1286 (Oct. 24,
1973).
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eral Convention that the Constitution should clog war and facilitate
peace.99 This provision of the War Powers Resolution sets that philos-
ophy on its head. The branch most prone to war is given a battle axe
by the branch thought to be most interested in peace.
Section 8(d)(2) of the Resolution may seem to restrict the grant of
power when it states that
[nlothing in this joint resolution-...
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the
President with respect to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances which authority he would not have had in the absence
of this joint resolution.
However, given the expansive interpretations of the Commander-in-
Chief s power by the occupiers of the oval office since President Tru-
man, that admonition can be taken with a grain of salt. The composite
message from the War Powers Resolution is that the President has an
open ended authorization from Congress to insert United States mili-
tary forces into hostilities whenever he deems it sound to do so. He
should consult; he must report; but in all events the decision to engage
in military action is in his hands. Once the President has taken action,
if the troops can be withdrawn within sixty days, the War Powers Reso-
lution will be satisfied. If the troops cannot be withdrawn within that
time period Congress will either have to sanction further hostilities or
force the issue to a confrontation of wills. The latter course has been
assiduously avoided.
Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution does retain in Congress
the power through joint resolution to rescind at any time the sixty day
war making authority granted the President. 1°° Thus even though
United States troops are committed to battle, Congress may order them
to withdraw. But even assuming the constitutionality of a legislative
veto in the war making context,10' this provision detracts rather than
99. FARRAND, supra note 17, at 319.
100. Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces
are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions
and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such
forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.
101. In Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983), the Supreme Court held that a single house veto in the context of the enforcement of
the Immigration Act was unconstitutional. There is a strong basis for distinguishing the
legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution from the one struck down in Chadha. En-
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adds to the constitutional responsibility of Congress. In the proper set-
ting-a delegation with precise standards-a legislative veto may be an
appropriate tool to ensure the responsible exercise of constitutional au-
thority. But in the context of the broad abdications of the War Powers
Resolution and in the absence of affirmative obligations imposed upon
Congress,10 2 the veto is merely another provision underscoring the sec-
ondary nature of congressional authority.
The purpose of the War Powers Resolution is, in its own terms,
to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the
United States and insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situa-
tions where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly in-
dicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such
forces in hostilities or in such situations.103
Unfortunately, the Resolution provides neither the guidance nor the
tools to achieve these very important goals. Instead of defining lines of
authority consistent with the constitutional framework, the Resolution
implicitly embraces a status quo dominated by presidential prerogative.
Instead of imposing procedures that would place Congress in the fore-
front of policy making, the Resolution codifies a system that presumes
continuing presidential initiative and-at best-congressional re-
sponse. Instead of fulfilling the intent of the framers, the Resolution
permits the President and Congress to continue to subvert that intent.
VII. THE RESOLUTION IN ACTION
Several deficiencies of the War Powers Resolution were forcefully
brought home by two events in 1983: the surprise invasion of Grenada
on October 25, 1983, and the crises that arose over the deployment of
the Marine peacekeeping force in Lebanon. In neither situation did the
War Powers Resolution curb the unilateral exercise of war power by
the executive branch or promote a meaningful participation by Con-
forcement is a clear executive function and the veto struck down in Chadha can be argued to
have impinged upon that executive function. With respect to the war power, however, the
Constitution expresses a strong preference for congressional oversight in that sphere. A leg-
islative veto in this context is a narrow compromise between the need to delegate and the
constitutional responsibility imposed on Congress. However, the majority opinion in
Chadha is a work of mechanical simplicity. Instead of examining the particular veto in a
constitutional context, the Court adopted a rigid textual formula that virtually ensures that
all legislative vetoes will be struck down in the foreseeable future.
102. See infra pp. 74-80, 97-100.
103. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973).
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gress in the exercise of that power. In fact, taken together these two
events underscore the urgent need for Congress to reassess its largely
passive approach to the war power.
A. Grenada
On the evening of October 24, 1983, five congressional leaders-
House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., House Majority Leader Jim
Wright, House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, Senate Majority
Leader Howard H. Baker, Jr. and Senate Minority Leader Robert C.
Byrd-were summoned to the White House for a confidential briefing.
At the briefing, the Administration announced that United States
armed forces would invade the island of Grenada the following morn-
ing. The President had signed the order to proceed with the invasion
,prior to meeting with these congressional leaders. 104 Thus, both the
ultimate decision to invade Grenada and the planning of that invasion
were made within the executive branch. The purpose of the October 24
briefing was primarily to provide these influential members of Con-
gress with notice of the impending invasion.
The invasion began as scheduled during the early morning hours
of October 25.105 During the invasion and subsequent clean-up opera-
tions, eighteen United States soldiers were killed in action and 116
were wounded; Grenadian casualties were more severe with forty-five
dead and 337 wounded."c In addition, twenty-four Cubans were
killed in action and fifty-nine were wounded. 10 7 Despite the resistance,
the entire island was secured in less than three days.108 By that time
over 5,500 American troops were on Grenada as part of the invasion
force. All United States combat troops were withdrawn by December
15, 1983, forty-eight days after the invasion began. 0 9 As of January
31, 1984, approximately 300 United States military personnel remained
on the island, primarily in a military police function. 110 The Adminis-
104. The Situation in Grenada" Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 12-13 (1983) (testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of
State). Moreover, according to Senator Byrd, the advice of the congressional leaders was
not solicited at the briefing. Whittle, Questions, Praise Follow Grenada Invasion, 41 CONo.
Q. 2221 (1983).
105. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, GRENADA, A PRE-
LIMrNARY REPORT 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY REPORT].
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Telephone interview with Jean Marie Ward, Public Affairs, Department of Defense
(January 31, 1984).
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tration has termed the invasion a complete success."I
Congress was officially informed of the invasion in an October 25
letter sent by the President to the Speaker of the House and to the Pres-
ident Pro Tempore of the Senate.112 The letter described in summary
fashion recent events in Grenada which indicated a complete collapse
of governmental institutions on the island. According to the letter, that
collapse endangered the lives of approximately 1,000 United States citi-
zens and posed a "threat to the peace and security of the region.""' 3
The message also explained that the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States (OECS) had organized a security force to restore order on
Grenada and, to this end, had requested assistance from the United
States. The President explained that he had authorized United States'
participation in the security force, including participation in an inva-
sion of Grenada which had begun that morning. The purpose of
United States participation in the invasion was "to join the OECS col-
lective security forces in assisting the restoration of conditions of law
and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada,
and to facilitate the protection and evacuation of United States
citizens." 1
4
With respect to the President's constitutional authority to order the
invasion, the letter explained that "[t]his deployment of United States
Armed Forces is being undertaken pursuant to my constitutional au-
thority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.""' The only
allusion to the War Powers Resolution came in a brief paragraph
which stated, "[iln accordance with my desire that the Congress be in-
formed on this matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution,
I am providing this report on this deployment of the United States
Armed Forces.""' 6
Most commentaries on the Grenada invasion have focused on the
wisdom, necessity and efficacy of the military action. But these assess-
ments beg the primary question, namely, whether within our carefully
structured system of government the President had the constitutional
authority to order an invasion of a foreign sovereign. If he acted with-
out such authority, then, regardless of the success or wisdom of the
111. See generally PRELiMINARY REPORT, supra note 105.
112. United States Forces in Grenada, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1493 (Oct. 25,
1983).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1494.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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mission, the republic has been disserved. Unquestionably the invasion
was an act of war and just as plainly the invasion had not been author-
ized by Congress.' 1 7 Nor did the request for assistance from the OECS
somehow enhance the President's constitutional power. Hence, here, as
in Youngstown,"' the sole question is whether the President had an
inherent or express constitutional authority for the unilateral action
taken.
As indicated above, the Administration specifically relied upon the
President's authority to conduct foreign relations and on his position as
Commander-in-Chief. The theory behind the reliance was not ex-
plained. Constitutional structure, however, is completely subverted by
the notion that the inherent authority to conduct foreign relations in-
cludes an independent capacity to make war. At best that authority
gives the President broad latitude in negotiating treaties and in entering
executive agreements on terms otherwise consistent with constitutional
structure. Certainly a vague, amorphous power nowhere mentioned in
the Constitution cannot be said to nullify express allocations of war
making authority. Similarly nothing in the Constitution or its structure
imbues the Commander-in-Chief with an independent authority to im-
plement foreign policy through military action. The independent au-
thority of the Commander-in-Chief is limited to a very narrow range of
defensive actions.1 9 It too is not a device through which the basic con-
stitutional structure can be radically reordered. The focus of the in-
quiry then must be upon the truly independent authority of the
Commander-in-Chief. The question is whether the invasion of Gre-
nada can be justified as an application of that authority.
On the facts announced by the Administration, there can be no
valid argument that the President's action was designed to repel a sud-
den attack upon this nation. Even though Grenada, with its Cuban
infiltration, may have presented a security risk to the United States, the
117. In fact, the action taken by the President would seem to be inconsistent with 22
U.S.C. § 1732 (1982) which provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any
foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of
that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful
and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith
demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably
delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of
war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and
all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be com-
municated by the President to Congress.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 6-16.
119. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
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President could not activate the Commander-in-Chiefs independent
authority without a showing-absent here-that the security risk was
of such an imminent and serious nature that it was the equivalent of a
sudden attack. Any broader application of this authority would disem-
bowel the constitutional structure. All military action is presumably
taken to address some security risk. But aside from the narrow circum-
stance of a sudden attack or its equivalent, our Constitution contem-
plates that Congress will determine whether the security risk is
sufficiently serious to justify military intervention and its attendant
consequences. Apparently the Soviet Union presents a security risk to
the United States, one perhaps even more substantial than the threat
presented by Gienada. If, based solely upon the security risk presented
by Grenada, the President had an independent constitutional authority
to invade that nation, he possesses that same authority to invade the
Soviet Union-at any time. The mere contemplation of such an expan-
sive presidential prerogative ought to supply its own refutation.
The Administration claimed that the invasion was necessary to
protect United States citizens living in Grenada-primarily students at-
tending the St. George medical school.' 20 The claim that the students
were endangered may have been well founded. On the other hand, the
protection of American lives has been a frequently abused pretext for
military incursions of a broader scale. But regardless of the merits of
this particular claim of endangerment, expediency does not define a
constitutional system of government. The sole question is whether the
President had independent constitutional authority to take military ac-
tion to protect those students.
Arguably, an attack upon United States citizens residing abroad
can be analogized to a sudden attack upon the nation. In both situa-
tions the Constitution could be read as recognizing the special compe-
tence of the executive branch to take decisive military action. But the
analogy is strained. The constitutional authority of the Commander-
in-Chief to repel sudden attacks is based not only on the efficiency of
executive response, but upon the immediacy of the threat to the territo-
rial integrity of the nation and its institutions, coupled with the poten-
tial inability of Congress to assemble and deliberate with the speed
requisite to ensure survival of the nation. The authority was designed
to preserve constitutional structure. Moreover, an exercise of this au-
thority merely recognizes a preexisting state of war calling for immedi-
ate response.
120. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 105, at 2.
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In the context of protecting United States citizens residing abroad,
neither the institutions nor the territorial integrity of this nation is in
jeopardy. There is no preexisting state of war. Thus although the pre-
dicament of the affected citizens may call for prompt and efficient ac-
tion, that predicament does not, in itself, warrant an alteration or
modification of the basic constitutional framework. Moreover, it is of
no small import that these citizens have voluntarily placed themselves
beyond the jurisdiction of this nation. Finally, an authority to rescue,
no matter how often invoked, simply does not enjoy the constitutional
pedigree associated with the authority to repel sudden attacks.
121
But the presidency is, after all, an office prone to action. As a
matter of practical reality, one should perhaps concede that neither a
theory of constitutional structure nor a specific statutory proscription
will prevent the occupiers of that office from taking unilateral action to
protect American citizens residing abroad. Political circumstances, not
constitutional theory, will dictate the extent to which this authority is
exercised. In fact, the notion that the President may not take immedi-
ate action to rescue American citizens would grate harshly against basic
perceptions of most Americans. While the Constitution need not pay
obeisance to all of our idiosyncracies, common experience and percep-
tions must play some part in defining realistic expectations under the
Constitution. Thus, despite misgivings one may entertain regarding the
constitutional roots of the President's authority to rescue, the question
more appropriately addressed is how to assimilate that maverick au-
thority into, the basic constitutional framework.
An authority which is at best implied from an otherwise contrary
constitutional structure ought to be narrowly confined to its articulated
purpose-here, the rescue of United States citizens from emergency sit-
uations. Certain guidelines suggest themselves. First, like the author-
ity to repel sudden attacks, the independent authority to rescue arises,
if at all, only when Congress as an institution is unable to address an
unanticipated emergency. With respect to sudden attacks, there is a
textual constitutional presumption that Congress will not be able to do
so. Such a general presumption is not applicable to rescue operations.
Those operations may involve emerging crises or they may involve rel-
atively static and predictable situations. Once it is conceded in a par-
ticular context that there is or has been a substantial opportunity to
contemplate action, the authority to decide whether to proceed de-
volves back to Congress. Congress may then delegate authority to the
121. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
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President, but the President is without authority, under such circum-
stances, to act in the absence of some action by Congress.
Next, the independent authority to rescue should be confined to
situations in which the rescue can be accomplished without the risk of
precipitating sustained hostilities. The authority to rescue surely does
not empower the President to override the responsibility of Congress to
determine whether this nation should embark upon a prolonged mili-
tary involvement within the borders of a foreign nation. Of course, this
guideline is not so much a check upon presidential power, as a factor to
be considered by the executive prior to ordering a particular rescue op-
eration. But this observation in no way derogates from the constitu-
tional dimensions of the guideline. The executive too has a
responsibility to see that constitutional structure is not subverted. Ex-
ecutive flaunting of this factor should be a source of political repudia-
tion in any post-hoc examination of the action taken.
122
Finally, the independent authority to rescue can only be as broad
as necessary to accomplish the specific mission. Under this authority,
the Commander-in-Chief is empowered to take appropriate military
action to directly secure the protection of the United States citizens and
to effect their evacuation. Nothing more. The discretion to exercise the
authority to rescue does not include a collateral right to direct military
action toward the accomplishment of goals unrelated to the immediate
protection of citizens and their evacuation. The overthrow of the ex-
isting political structure regardless of how anarchic it may appear is an
undeniable and unconstitutional expansion of the authority to res-
cue.' 23 Whatever the merits of the authority to rescue, only Congress
can authorize military action designed to establish a new political order
in a foreign nation. That is war, plain and simple.
In short, the President's authority to rescue United States citizens
voluntarily residing abroad is at best a very limited exception to the
constitutional structure. It should be exercised with care and only to
the extent necessary to effectuate its underlying purpose.
The invasion of Grenada was a constitutionally irresponsible act.
Putting aside for the moment the safety of the students, the security of
this nation was not imperiled by anything resembling a sudden at-
122. See infra pp. 640-42.
123. There may be situations in which the military must overthrow an existing political
structure in order to rescue United States citizens. Such a drastic necessity would seem to
call for congressional authorization. Assuming that the President proceeds with such an
action without congressional authorization, the President would bear a heavy burden of
establishing a direct and necessary relationship between the overthrow and the rescue
operation.
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tack.124 Although vital United States interests may have been endan-
gered by the Cuban and Soviet presence in Grenada, Congress could
have been prevailed upon to determine whether to authorize the Presi-
dent to take appropriate military action. Congress, not the President, is
vested with the authority to make such basic determinations of national
policy.125 On this point, there should be no doubt. Next, even assum-
ing the President had the constitutional authority to invade Grenada in
order to protect United States citizens, that authority did not give the
President the prerogative to extend the military action to "the restora-
tion of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to
the island of Grenada. ... "126 Nothing in our framework of govern-
ment sanctions such constitutional bootstrapping. Yet the war in Gre-
nada was plainly and openly conducted toward the end of establishing
a political structure compatible with United States interests.1 27 This
aspect of the military intervention has no plausible constitutional justi-
fication. The President in ordering the military to achieve this goal
acted in plain and direct violation of the Constitution he is sworn to
uphold.
The invasion did generate a response in Congress. On November
1, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved a resolution
that invoked sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution
and defined October 25 as the date upon which United States Armed
Forces entered into hostilities, thus triggering the sixty day limitation
provided in section 5(b). 128 The Senate, by a vote of sixty-four to
twenty, had adopted identical language on October 28 in a rider to a
debt ceiling bill.12 9 Despite the apparent consensus between the House
and the Senate, neither measure reached the President's desk. The
House Joint Resolution was not acted upon in the Senate and the Sen-
ate rider was deleted during Conference Committee negotiations on the
debt ceiling. The intensity of the initial response dissipated in part
124. The Administration has made no such claim. See generally PRELIMINARY REPORT,
supra note 105.
125. See supra pp. 600-04.
126. United States Forces in Grenanda, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1493 (Oct. 25,
1983).
127. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. See generally PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT, supra note 105. Indeed, there is a substantial argument that the rescue of United
States citizens was only of secondary importance and that the OECS request was used as a
shield for a long awaited opportunity to invade Grenada. See Britain's Grenada Shut.Out,
THE EcoNoMisT, March 10, 1984, at 31-34.
128. H.R.J. Res. 402, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H8933-34 (daily ed. Nov. 1,
1983).
129. 129 CONG. REC. S14,876-77 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1983).
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because public reaction to the invasion had been favorable and in part
because of guarantees by the Administration that the bulk of the troops
would be withdrawn within the sixty day period.' 30 Of course, by Oc-
tober 28, the troops in Grenada were technically no longer in a hostile
zone. The island had been pacified. Thus regardless of the conclusion
drawn by Congress with respect to hostilities on October 25, the War
Powers Resolution may have been tolled by the success of the military
action.
Congress could have and should have done more. Every unilat-
eral exercise of war power by the President requires an immediate,
searching examination of the constitutional premises for the action
taken. If those premises are determined to be sound, a congressional
endorsement of constitutionality would be appropriate. If those prem-
ises are unsound, the President's action should be clearly and precisely
repudiated for its constitutional deficiencies. This is more than an aca-
demic exercise. It is an exercise of congressional duty that must be
undertaken if Congress is to play any role in curbing expansive notions
of presidential prerogative. Such a process of constitutional examina-
tion serves to define the relative authorities of each branch and to un-
derscore the need for particular congressional action to remedy
perceived imbalances in those authorities.
Congress failed to make such an inquiry into the President's little
war in Grenada. 3 It readily accepted the assertion that the students at
St. George medical school were in need of a military style evacuation.
It did not, as an institution, question the constitutionality of the expan-
sion of the military action beyond the evacuation of those students.
This failure to scrupulously examine the President's use of military
force signals a willingness to permit the executive branch to exercise
freely an independent and unconstitutional authority to make war. It
permits the executive branch to define broadly the limits of its own
power. The war in Grenada may have been a miniscule affair. The
130. See 41 CONG. Q. 2292-93, 2360-61 (1983).
131. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a single hearing on the invasion. The
Situation in Grenada: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12-13 (1983) (testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State). The
hearing lasted slightly less than two and one half hours and was attended by only seven
members of the committee. Few probing questions were asked and the constitutional issue
was left drifting in limbo. At a markup session on H.R.J. Res. 402, Rep. Weiss and Levine
did broach the subject of the constitutionality of the President's action. However, Weiss'
suggested amendment to the resolution stating that the invasion was in violation of the Con-
stitution was ruled out of order by the chair. Grenada War Powers: Full Compliance Report-
ing and Implementation, Markup on H.J.J Res. 402 Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-21 (1983).
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congressional response to that war was, however, part of a larger pat-
tern of congressional trepidation. If Congress cannot assert its constitu-
tional duty in the context of a Grenada, one can retain little hope for a
significant congressional response to larger scale conflicts.
One basic shortcoming of the War Powers Resolution is its im-
plicit and somewhat naive assumption that a legalistic limitation fo-
cused on presidential action will effect a modification of presidential
attitude and practice. The Resolution had little or no effect upon the
President's unilateral decision to invade Grenada. Nor did it generate
a substantial congressional response to the invasion. As to the latter,
early moves to invoke section 4(a)(1) dissipated as the initial shock of
the invasion was assimilated into the hoopla over the success of the
mission. A key to restoring constitutional structure to the war power is,
however, affirmative and specific congressional action. Ideally, that ac-
tion arises at a policy making stage. However, faced with an ongoing
or completed presidential military initiative, the responsibility of Con-
gress does not magically evaporate. If anything, the need for an affirm-
ative assertion of congressional will is more acute. Only when
Congress demonstrates its resolve to shoulder responsibility through
specific responses to presidential action, will the executive branch take
seriously the otherwise vacuous admonitions of the War Powers
Resolution.
The primary focus of the War Powers Resolution should be shifted
away from limitations on presidential action and aimed directly upon
the affirmative obligations of Congress. This could be accomplished
through the adoption of a precise and relatively automatic system for
reviewing deployments arising under the War Powers Resolution. The
invasion of Grenada and its aftermath suggest two such devices:
(1) creation of a trigger device that requires an immediate decision by
Congress, through joint resolution, of whether section 4(a)(1) has been
activated; and, (2) upon a determination that section 4(a)(1) has been
activated, a requirement that Congress immediately convene hearings
for a prompt determination on the constitutionality of the presidential
action.
Certainly there are several creative methods for triggering an auto-
matic and definitive section 4(a)(1) determination. 32 One simple ap-
proach is to require expedited consideration of any resolution
132. Of course, §§ 4(a)(1), 5(b) are activated by military, not political, events. However,
as a practical matter some branch of the government must indicate an assessment that those
military events have taken place. This places both branches on notice that the 60 day limita-
tion of § 5(b) has been activated as of a date certain. Since Congress, through the War
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indicating the sense of Congress that on a date certain and in a defined
location, United States Armed Forces met with hostilities or the immi-
nent threat of hostilities within the meaning of section 4(a)(1). If that
approach would lead to abuse, some minimal sponsorship requirement
could be a prerequisite to the expedited consideration. In any event, a
procedure should be adopted by Congress through which such a resolu-
tion could be given full consideration by both Houses within three days
of its introduction into either chamber. Since invocation of section
4(a)(1) does not require an automatic pullout of United States troops
involved in hostilities, the adoption of such a resolution does not re-
quire a policy determination. It merely indicates the sense of Congress
that the sixty day limitation of section 5(b) has begun to run.
Assuming a joint resolution invoking section 4(a)(1) is adopted by
Congress, hearings, undertaken preferably by a committee composed
of members of both Houses, should be automatically activated. The
purpose of those hearings would be to undertake a review of the consti-
tutionality of the President's action and to report to Congress and the
nation on the conclusions derived from that review.133 A joint commit-
tee composed of members of the Senate and House Committees on the
Judiciary would seem particularly appropriate since those committees
and their staffs have general responsibilities and developed expertise in
the realm of constitutional law. Other committee configurations are
possible. In any event, the structure and procedures of this committee
must be set in advance. And regardless of the particular approach
adopted, the focus of the inquiry should be upon the constitutional
dimensions of the presidential action, not upon the substantive merits
of the military mission. These hearings should be required to com-
mence immediately upon the invocation of section 4(a)(1). A report on
those hearings, accompanied by an appropriate resolution, should be
delivered to Congress within thirty days of the invocation of section
4(a)(1). Upon submission of that report and resolution to Congress,
both Houses should be required to consider the resolution on an expe-
dited basis.
There is nothing sacrosanct about the details of this proposal. The
details are less important than the thrust. The point is to require Con-
gress to seriously consider the constitutional ramifications of individual
instances of presidential war making. At a minimum, such a self-im-
Powers Resolution, is attempting to protect its constitutionally created sphere of responsibil-
ity, the appropriate branch to make that determination is Congress.
133. The role of Congress in determining upon deployment authorizations beyond the 60
day period is discussed infra pp. 651-52.
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posed requirement would generate a public debate on the constitu-
tional question. This alone would present a significant opportunity to
improve the nation's constitutional literacy. Next, assuming the in-
quiry is undertaken in a sensible and serious fashion, it may activate in
Congress a sense of its own constitutional mission. Perhaps Congress
would eventually realize that it cannot achieve its constitutional mis-
sion without injecting itself into the policy making stage. Finally, an
awareness that a probing congressional inquiry would ensue upon the
unilateral exercise of war making power may force the executive
branch to carefully examine its otherwise expansive and cavalier no-
tions of an inherent power to make war. None of this is guaranteed.
Preordained procedures can be circumvented by parliamentary tech-
nique. Ultimate conclusions on constitutionality can be suffocated in a
web of legalese. But with the focus upon congressional duty, matters
would at least be pointed in the proper direction and the public would
be better able to assess the adequacy of its representation on Capitol
Hill.
A searching examination of the constitutional premises of the deci-
sion to invade Grenada would have placed the executive branch on
notice that regardless of its ability to skirt or stretch constitutional
structure, its actions will be placed under the close scrutiny of Congress
and the nation. It may not be possible to prevent the executive branch
from proceeding with military actions such as the invasion of Grenada.
It is, however, quite possible to create an environment of congressional
activism that will at least place a political price tag on the executive
proclivity to unsheath the saber. With a serious exercise of congres-
sional oversight, the lines of authority may be stretched from time to
time, but they will not be forever broken.
B. Lebanon
In July of 1958, President Eisenhower sent 5,000 Marines into
Lebanon to "protect American lives" and to preserve "Lebanon's terri-
torial integrity and independence."' 34 The forces reached a peak level
of 15,000, but were withdrawn in October of that same year.135 This
intervention had been at the request of the Lebanese government, but
134. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 422, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
135. 39 DEP'T ST. BULL. 650-51 (1958); 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESS
AND THE NATION 1945-1964: A REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR
YEARS 122 (1965).
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was accomplished without the prior authorization of Congress.' 36 It
represents but one of many minor landmarks in the erosion of congres-
sional responsibility. Twenty-four years later, the Marines returned to
Lebanon, again to assist the government of that nation in achieving
stability and again the deployment was accomplished without the au-
thorization of Congress. This time, however, Congress was armed with
the War Powers Resolution and presumably with a fresh sense of its
constitutional responsibility. Yet neither the War Powers Resolution
nor the lessons of recent history prevented Congress from avoiding its
constitutional duty.
In July of 1982, the executive branch reported to Congress that it
had decided in principle to send troops to Lebanon as part of a mul-
tinational peacekeeping force.' 37 Several members of Congress argued
that any deployment of troops to Lebanon would have to be reported
under sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.138 Rep-
resentative Clement Zablocki, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, concluded in a letter to the President: "Any common-sense
assessment of the situation in Lebanon must conclude that, if the
United States agrees to participate in this multinational force, it would
be introducing its armed forces into hostilities or into a situation where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circum-
stances."'' 39 Accordingly, any deployment beyond sixty days would re-
quire express congressional authorization. Zablocki was certainly
correct, although he might have added that the initial decision of
whether to participate in the multinational force was also one for Con-
gress to make. Although participation in a multinational peacekeeping
force is not itself an act of war, the deployment of United States troops
into a foreign nation is a clear exercise of the war power of the national
government and a constitutional exercise of that power requires an ini-
tial determination by Congress 40 As a consequence, the Administra-
tion's decision should have been treated, in principle, as a proposal for
legislation. Congress was duty-bound to immediately address and re-
solve whether to approve the proposed deployment. But instead of
seizing this ideal opportunity to assert congressional authority at a cru-
cial policy making stage, Zablocki's letter to the President, coupled
with other similar congressional responses, implicitly conceded the
136. See infra note 137.
137. Reagan Sends Aid, Troops to Lebanon, 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 167-70 (1983).
138. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Eagleton to the President of the United States, July 16,
1982, reprinted in 129 CONG. REC. S 12,189 (Sept. 14, 1983).
139. 128 CONG. Rac. E3183-84 (daily ed. July 13, 1982).
140. See supra notes 3-42 and accompanying text.
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right of the President to proceed with the planned deployment without
the express authorization of Congress. Congressional responsibility
would be activated only after the troops were deployed "into hostilities
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances."' 4 1 The technical requirements of the
War Powers Resolution masked the more fundamental responsibilities
created by the Constitution.
On August 25, 1982, the decision in principle became a decision in
fact. On that date a contingent of approximately 800 Marines was
deployed to Beirut to assist in the evacuation of Palestinian guerillas.142
A report on the deployment was sent to Congress, "[i]n accordance
with [the President's] desire that the Congress be fully informed on this
matter, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution .... ,,143 The
President, according to the report, had concluded that United States
involvement in the evacuation process would improve the prospects for
peace in Lebanon and for stability in the region. As a consequence, he
ordered the deployment of Marines "pursuant to [his] constitutional
authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces." 144 Although the
Marines were equipped with infantry weapons, there was no expecta-
tion that they would become involved in hostilities.1 45 Moreover, the
deployment was temporary; the Marines would be withdrawn from
Lebanon within thirty days.146 On September 10, after the evacuation
of 14,000 Palestinian guerillas had been completed, the Marines were
withdrawn from Lebanon. No casualties had been suffered.
Ten days later, however, the President announced to the nation
that the Marines would be returning to Beirut.1 47 On September 16, the
newly elected President of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated;
between September 16 and 18, there was a brutal massacre of Palestin-
ian civilians in Beirut refugee camps.' 48 In general, the ability of the
government of Lebanon to maintain the peace was seriously in doubt.
Accordingly, the President, on September 20, announced to the nation
141. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 4(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (1973).
142. Deployment of United States Forces in Beirut Lebanon, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1065-66 (Aug. 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Deployment of Forces in Beirut].
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1066. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
145. Deployment of Forces in Beirut, supra note 142, at 1065, 1066.
146. Id. at 1066.
147. Address to the Nation Announcing the Formation of a New Multinational Force, 18
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1182 (Sept. 20, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Address on New
Multinational Force].
148. S. REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983).
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that "[t]he international community has an obligation to assist the gov-
ernment of Lebanon in reasserting authority over all its territory. For-
eign forces and armed factions have too long obstructed the legitimate
role of the government of Lebanon's security forces. We must pave the
way for withdrawal of foreign forces." 149 The multinational force, in-
cluding a contingent of Marines, would return to Beirut in a
peacekeeping function. The overall goal of the multinational force
would be restoration of "a str5ng and stable central government" in
Lebanon.
150
On September 29, 1,200 Marines arrived in Beirut. On that same
day, the President sent a letter to Congress, "consistent with the War
Powers Resolution," reporting this latest deployment. 5  The letter de-
scribed the purpose of the mission as "the restoration of Lebanese Gov-
ernment sovereignty and authority ... 52 In attempting to achieve
this goal, the Marines would provide what was characterized as "an
interposition force." As in the previous message on Lebanon, the Presi-
dent emphasized that there was no "expectation that U.S. Armed
Forces will become involved in hostilities."' 5 3 Finally, the deployment
was ordered pursuant to the President's "constitutional authority with
respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief
of the United States Armed Forces."'
54
As with the August 25 deployment, Congress had been given an
opportunity to exercise its constitutional responsibility prior to the ac-
tual commitment of troops. Again Congress failed to do so. The focus
of the congressional response was upon technical requisites of the War
Powers Resolution; the authority of the President to order the deploy-
ment was implicitly conceded. A number of members did argue, how-
ever, as Zablocki had prior to the first deployment, that in order to
comply with the War Powers Resolution the President must report this
149. Address on New Multinational Force, supra note 147, at 1183.
150. Id. The mandate of the multinational force was as follows:
The MNF (multinational force) is to provide an interposition force at agreed
locations and thereby provide the MNF presence requested by the Government of
Lebanon to assist it and Lebanon's armed forces in the Beirut area. This presence
will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority
over the Beirut area and thereby further its efforts to assure the safety of persons in
the area and to bring to an end the violence which has tragically recurred.
Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary to the President, 18 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1196 (Sept. 23, 1982).
151. Letter from the President of the United States to the Speaker of the House and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1232 (Sept. 29, 1982).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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second deployment under sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b).155 Any deploy-
ment beyond the Resolution's sixty day limitation, set to expire on No-
vember 29, 1982, would require express authorization from Congress.
However, in both letters to Congress referenced above, the President
had carefully avoided invoking section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Res-
olution. Indeed, the reports to Congress were not pursuant to the War
Powers Resolution, but "consistent" with it, avoiding any suggestion
that the President recognized the validity of the Resolution.
The debate over the applicability of section 4(a)(1) soon dissipated
and November 29 came and went with the Marines in place and with-
out any substantial effort by Congress to immerse itself responsibly in
this exercise of the war power.156 Up to this point, only one Marine of
the peacekeeping force had been killed and his death was the result of
an accident with an unexploded bomb. The relatively quiet deploy-
ment in Lebanon could be ignored.'57
The ability to ignore Lebanon evaporated in late summer of 1983.
On August 29, two Marines were killed and fourteen were wounded in
fighting with Muslim rebels. 5 In September, the fighting around Bei-
rut International Airport escalated dramatically. 5 9 Several Marines
were wounded during that month and two more were killed.' 60 Navy
ships began shelling rebel positions.' 6 1 The President ordered 2,000
more Marines stationed off the coast of Lebanon.' 62 As a consequence,
the insistence by Congress that the Administration invoke section
155. See, e.g., 128 CONG. Rac. E4576 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Rep. Jim
Leach); letter from Sen. Eagleton to the President of the United States (Sept. 23, 1983),
reprintedin 129 CONG. REc. S12,189 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983).
156. On December 15, 1982, 14 members of the Foreign Relations Committee did send a
letter to the President urging him to seek formal congressional authorization for any expan-
sion or long term continuation of the United States military presence in Lebanon. See S.
REP. No. 72, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1983). The letter went on to observe, "[i]n the longer
term, it may be appropriate to consider more general legislation to clarify the respective
roles of the President and the Congress in undertaking the commitment of U.S. Armed
Forces to such operations." Id. However, the letter did not suggest any steps to ensure
immediate congressional involvement in the responsibility for the deployment of Marines in
Beirut.
157. In March of 1983, Congress adopted the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act which
included a specific limitation upon the size and role of the Marine contingent in the multina-
tional force. See Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-43, 97 Stat.
214 (1983).
158. 41 CONG. Q. 1876 (1983).
159. Id. at 1912.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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4(a)(1) was renewed and intensified.'63 The question was not whether
the Marines should remain in Lebanon. There was little support for
ordering an immediate withdrawal."6 Rather the focus was, as it had
been in 1982, upon the technical requisites of the War Powers Resolu-
tion. A few members did observe, quite correctly, that in order to fulfill
its constitutional responsibilities Congress would have to venture be-
yond a procedural invocation of the War Powers Resolution to a sub-
stantive determination of whether to support the continued deployment
of the Marines in Lebanon.1 65  The importance of this observation
seemed to elude Congress as a whole.' 6 6 In any event, despite the
mounting casualties and despite the fact that the Marines in Beirut be-
gan receiving combat pay in August of 1983,167 the Administration ad-
amantly refused to acknowledge that section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution had been activated. 68 The events in Beirut were described
163. 129 CONG. REc. H6694, E4193 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1983) (statement of Rep. Dow-
ney); id. at H6696 (statement of Rep. Coats); id. at S12,169-73 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983)
(statement of Sen. Byrd); id. at S12,177 (statement of Sen. Riegle); id. at S12,177-78 (state-
ment of Sen. Jepsen); id. at S12,178 (statement of Sen. Chiles); id. at S12,179-80 (statement
of Sen. Zorinsky); id. at S12,180 (statement of Sen. Bentsen); id at S12,180-81 (statement of
Sen. Katsen); id at S12,181-83 (statement of Sen. Exon); id at S 12,181-83 (statement of Sen.
Bumpers); id. at S12,184 (statement of Sen. Sasser); id. at S12,184-85 (statement of Sen.
Biden); id. at S12,185 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); id. at S12,185-87 (statement of Sen.
Dodd); id. at S12,187 (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at S12,187-88 (statement of Sen.
Eagleton); id. at S 12,192-93 (statement of Sen. Pell); id. at H7119 (statement of Rep. Frost);
id. at 7123 (statement of Rep. Markey); id. at E4393 (statement of Rep. Zablocki); id. at
E4419 (statement of Rep. Seiberling); id. at S12,256-57 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1983) (statement
of Sen. Mitchell); id. at H6932 (statement of Rep. Paul); id. at S 12,395-96 (daily ed. Sept. 19,
1983) (statement of Sen. Dixon); id. at H7008-09 (statement of Rep. Sikorsk); id. at H7009-
10 (statement of Rep. Alexander); id. at H7177 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Obey); id. at H7181 (statement of Rep. Roemer); id. at H7182 (statement of Rep. Downey);
id. at H7288 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1983) (statement of Rep. Kaptur); id. at H7290 (statement of
Rep. Roemer); id. at H7557 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983) (statement of Rep. Ratchford); id. at
H7564 (statement of Rep. Zablocki). See also Resolution of the Democratic Conference on
September 14, 1983, reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. S12,193 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (unani-
mous resolution by Senate Democrats invoking §§ 4(a)(1), 5(b) of the War Powers Resolu-
tion); Kennedy, President's Disregard of War Powers Act, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1983.
164. Events in Lebanon: Hearing Before the Senate Comn on Foreign Relations, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 16 (1983) (statement of Sen. Tsongas) [hereinafter cited as Events in
Lebanon].
165. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S12,178 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (statement of Sen.
Chiles); id. at S12,180 (statement of Sen. Bentsen); id. at S12,185-87 (statement of Sen.
Dodd); Id. at S 12,192-93 (statement of Sen. Wallop); id. at S12,256 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1983)
(statement of Sen. Mitchell).
166. See infra text accompanying notes 180-183.
167. Events in Lebanon, supra note 164, at 26 (testimony of Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Com-
mandant, United States Marine Corps).
168. See id. at 14 (testimony of Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Commandant, United States Marine
Corps); id. at 9-10, 17-18, 20-24 (testimony of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor, Depart-
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with a precision that carefully avoided the term "hostilities." In a letter
informing Congress of the August 29 casualties, the President charac-
terized the fighting as "sporadic." 169 Similarly, in a press conference on
August 31, Secretary of State Shultz characterized events in Lebanon as
"a situation where there is violence. It is a generalized pattern of
violence."' 7
The rigid and artificial linguistic and legalistic distinctions drawn
by the Administration focused the debate on abstract terms. The
meaning of the War Powers Resolution, rather than the Administra-
tion's policy in Lebanon, became the central concern. In short, a sub-
stantive examination of the wisdom and efficacy of the Marine
deployment was effectively submerged in a fatuous verbal gunplay be-
tween the two branches. The battle came down to this: Congress in-
sisted that the President invoke the War Powers Resolution; the
President insisted that the Resolution did not apply. The presumption
was that regardless of who prevailed, the troops would remain in
Lebanon.
While the debate over the language and applicability of the War
Powers Resolution raged on, efforts were underway to achieve a com-
promise that would preserve the War Powers Resolution and at the
same time accommodate the President's wide ranging view of his pow-
ers as Commander-in-Chief. 171 Senate Joint Resolution 159 was the
vehicle for that compromise. Section 3 of Resolution 159 declared the
determination of Congress that section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Reso-
lution had become operative with respect to the Marines stationed in
Beirut on August 29, 1983. Sections 4 and 6 of Resolution 159, how-
ever, authorized the continued participation by the Marines in the mul-
tinational force for an additional eighteen months. The Joint
Resolution also incorporated the terms of the Lebanon Emergency
Assistance Act of 1983172 which prohibited the President from ex-
panding substantially the size of the Marine contingent deployed in
Lebanon or from altering the role of those forces. 7 3 Resolution 159
ment of State); see also Multinational Force in Lebanon, Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as Multinational Force].
169. United States Forces in Lebanon, 19 WEEKLY ComP. PREs. Doc. 1186-87 (Aug. 30,
1983).
170. 41 CONG. Q. 1876 (1983); see also Multinational Force, supra note 168, at 29 (state-
ment of George Shultz; Secretary of State).
171. See 41 CONG. Q. 1923-25, 1963-65 (1983).
172. Pub. L. No. 98-43, 97 Stat. 214 (1983).
173. The latter limitation assumes that the role of the Marines had been defined with
sufficient clarity to permit a conclusion that under certain circumstances that role had been
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did not require that the President concur in the invocation of the War
Powers Resolution. Nor was its adoption premised upon any demon-
stration by the Administration of the necessity for the Marine
deployment.
Dissenting members of the Committee on Foreign Relations
which had favorably reported the bill (Senators Pell, Biden, Glenn,
Sarbanes, Zorinsky, Tsongas, Cranston and Dodd dissented from the
majority report) described the compromise as follows:
In our judgment, [Senate Joint Resolution 159's] enactment
would constitute (1) a dereliction of Congressional responsi-
bility to uphold the principles and procedures of the War
Powers Resolution of 1973; (2) a failure to require of the Ad-
ministration a clearly articulated and persuasive statement of
the mission which U.S. Marines have been deployed in Leba-
non to implement; and (3) an 18-month 'blank check' under
which the Administration could pursue hitherto unspecified
military objectives in Lebanon while asserting that it is oper-
ating with full Congressional sanction. 74
Those members had suggested that instead of a broad based compro-
mise, Congress simply invoke section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution. 
175
Senate Joint Resolution 159 was adopted in the Senate by a fifty-
four to forty-six margin on September 29, after three days of debate. 1
76
That same day, the House of Representatives, which had been consid-
ering a similar measure, approved the Senate Joint Resolution by a 253
to 156 margin.177 The resolution was signed by the President on Octo-
ber 12. A presidential statement that accompanied the signing specifi-
cally disavowed the congressional determination that section 4(a)(1)
had been activated by the bloodshed in Beirut and disparaged the con-
stitutionality of both the War Powers Resolution and any implications
expanded. Apropos of this, the Minority Views of the Committee on Foreign Relations
stated,
over the period of 1 year, the stated mission of U.S. forces in Lebanon has ex-
panded from a limited role, the feasibility of which Congress could evaluate, to a
role too nebulous for Congress to evaluate and too far-reaching for U.S. military
forces alone possibly to accomplish. Consequently, the effect of the resolution is to
provide Congressional acquiescence in a policy involving American soldiers in a
commitment the scope of which has yet to be defined even by its proponents.
S. REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983).
174. S. REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983).
175. Id. at 3.
176. 129 CONG. REc. S13,167 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1983).
177. Id. at H7724.
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of Senate Joint Resolution 159 that might suggest a congressional abil-
ity to confine the power of the Commander-in-Chief. t78 In fact, prior
to the adoption of this Resolution, the Administration had taken the
position that regardless of any compromise reached with Congress, the
President would not be bound by the measure if, as Commander-in-
Chief, he determined that military action beyond that contemplated by
the compromise was appropriate.
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The compromise was a constitutional disaster. Congress, in an ef-
fort to avoid a confrontation with the executive branch, failed to under-
take a serious examination of the merits of Marine deployment in
Lebanon.18 0 It delegated a limited authority to exercise the war power
based largely on the pressures of the political moment. Although the
deficiencies of Senate Joint Resolution 159 pale in comparison to those
of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, both resolutions share the similar
flaw of having been adopted without a prior examination by Congress
178. Statement on Signing S.J. Res. Into Law, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1422-23
(Oct. 12, 1983).
179. Multinational Force, supra note 168, at 27-28 (dialogue between Secretary of State
Shultz and Sen. Sarbanes). The Reagan Administration's view of the Commander-in-
Chiefs power is quite broad. If one accepts the testimony of Davis R. Robinson, Legal
Advisor, Department of State, the President is free to use military forces in any manner he
deems fit, so long as Congress' power to declare war remains technically intact. See Events in
Lebanon, supra note 164, at 8, 18-19, 21, 23 (testimony of Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor,
Department of State). Congress may attempt to prevent such exercises only by risking a
constitutional crisis. Id. at 21.
180. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report that accompanied S.J. Res. 159
discussed American objectives in Lebanon in what can be charitably described as the va-
guest of generalities. S. REP. No. 242, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1983). This is understanda-
ble since testimony taken by the Committee from members of the Administration provided
little guidance in defining those objectives. See Multinational Force, supra note 168, at 6-8
(statement of George Schultz, Secretary of State). The role of the Marines in assisting to
achieve those generalities was covered in two brief paragraphs of the Committee Report,
neither of which actually describe how the Marines could be expected to achieve any foreign
policy objectives whatsoever. Those paragraphs, in their entirety, read as follows:
The role of the marines.-The Multinational Force, which includes a contingent
of U.S. Marines, is another vehicle for implementing our broader policy objectives
in Lebanon. The Committee agrees with Secretary Shultz's assurances that "it is
not the mission of our Marines, or of the MNF as a whole, to maintain the military
balance in Lebanon by themselves ... .They are an important deterrent, a sym-
bol of the international backing behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon
The Committee understands that the role of the Marines is limited. The au-
thorization of the presence of the Marines does not remove previous limitations on
their deployment. Marine activities are restricted to the "Beirut area" and the
number of Marine combat troops based onshore will remain approximately 1,200.
The Resolution specifically states that it does not modify Section 4 of the Lebanese
Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 which require congressional authorization for
any substantial expansion in the number or role of the U.S. peacekeeping forces.
S. REP. No. 242, supra, at 5-6.
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of the wisdom and necessity for authorizing the presidential action con-
templated. The War Powers Resolution was also dealt a serious blow.
If the War Powers Resolution has any value, it must be in its ability to
force Congress to make policy determinations based on a substantive
examination of the merits of ongoing presidential exercises of the war
power. In avoiding that policy determination, Congress underscored
the Resolution's lack of effectiveness.
A more sensible and constitutionally responsible approach was
available. Nothing in the War Powers Resolution requires an admis-
sion by the executive branch that troops are engaged in hostilities. The
automatic triggering device suggested earlier 8' would have obviated
the bizarre debate with the executive branch over whether Marines re-
ceiving enemy fire were confronted with hostilities. Instead, the ques-
tion should have been immediately placed before Congress and
expeditiously resolved. "Then," in the words of Senator Lawton Chiles
of Florida, "when the President begins to consult with Congress we can
take the time to gather the facts and make an informed judgment on
our policy in Lebanon." '182
In other words, Congress was confronted with two distinct ques-
tions. The first, whether to invoke section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution, involved a straightforward assessment of facts, permitting,
under the circumstances, only one conclusion. A compromise was un-
necessary. The second, whether to authorize the Marine deployment
beyond sixty days, called for a careful and thorough evaluation of pol-
icy. Essential to the latter evaluation would have been a persuasive
and detailed statement, provided by the administration, of the foreign
policy objective to be achieved by the deployment coupled with a con-
vincing explanation of the manner in which the military presence of the
Marines would advance that objective.18 3 In the absence of such state-
ment, Congress could not, consistent with its constitutional responsibil-
ities, authorize further deployment. The troops would have to be
withdrawn within sixty days.
This framework does require some faith in congressional resolve
and presidential compliance. There is no legalistic or magic formula to
guarantee either. Resolve can only derive from the insistence by the
public that individual members of Congress courageously exercise the
constitutional trust imposed upon them. A combination of public
181. See supra pp. 640-41.
182. 129 CONG. REC. S12,178 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1983) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
183. See 129 CONG. REC. S12,925-26 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1983) (dialogue between Sen.
Chiles and Sen. Biden).
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awareness and political accountability is the key. As to presidential
compliance, a direct invocation of section 4(a)(1) would not be politi-
cally weightless. Political posturing and maneuvering aside, the most
likely response by the executive branch would be a concerted effort to
convince Congress of the necessity of the proposed policy. If it ap-
peared that an express authorization was not forthcoming and if it ap-
peared that Congress was resolute, it is by no means certain that the
President would risk the inevitable political fallout that a direct and
specific repudiation of the War Powers Resolution would engender.
Presumably such a risk would be taken under only the most compelling
of circumstances. When that occurs, Congress would be in a position
to assess the merits of precise measures designed to force a withdrawal
of troops or, in light of the President's insistence, to reassess the deci-
sion not to authorize continued deployment.
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Once Congress affirms that section 4(a)(1) has been activated, the
hearing procedures with respect to the constitutionality of the presiden-
tial action must commence.' 85 In addition, Congress will likely be
called upon to determine whether to authorize a continuation of the
deployment beyond sixty days. The War Powers Resolution (or inter-
nal congressional procedures) should be modified to include a require-
ment, effective upon a congressional invocation of section 4(a)(1), that
the President submit a detailed report to the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations and to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs regard-
ing the foreign policy objective of the subject deployment and the
manner in which the deployment will effectively achieve the purported
objective. 'In the absence of such a report or a specific showing of exi-
gent circumstances excusing the report, Congress should be precluded
from authorizing the subject deployment beyond the sixty day maxi-
mum set in section 5(b). This framework would separate consideration
of the authorization of a presidential deployment from both the section
4(a)(1) question and the constitutional determination. Although such
procedures could not force Congress to act with constitutional responsi-
bility, they would focus attention upon constitutionally relevant factors
and make circumvention of constitutional duty less easily submerged in
the rush to compromise.
184. Requiring the executive to clearly and convincingly articulate the purpose and effi-
cacy of a particular military mission has the additional important benefit of forcing the
executive to carefully examine the wisdom of its own policies.
185. See supra pp. 641-42.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Our Constitution creates a structure of government that vests pri-
mary responsibility for defining national policy in the most representa-
tive branch. That structure is applicable to exercises of all power
vested in the national government, including the war power. Such a
structure places great faith in the political maturity of the populace.
Beginning largely in the twentieth century and accelerating since
World War II, however, Congress has become reluctant to assert its
constitutional authority with respect to the war power. The President's
practical power combined with this congressional reluctance has cre-
ated a severe threat to our representative system of government. Worse
yet, as a nation we have become accustomed to this imbalance, so
much so that unilateral exercises of presidential power are often ac-
cepted without question as part of the ordained system.
The War Powers Resolution was designed, ostensibly, to redress
that imbalance. The Resolution is, however, based upon the faulty
premise that Congress can effectively exercise its constitutional respon-
sibility from a reactive posture, leaving initiative in the executive
branch. Moreover, even to the extent that the Resolution has the po-
tential to insert Congress into the policy mode as a response to presi-
dential action, its effectiveness can only be as broad as congressional
willingness to use the framework imposed by the legislation. So far
Congress has been at best timid. If Congress is to accept the burdens
imposed upon it by the Constitution, then it must do more than pay
symbolic homage to the War Powers Resolution. The direction Con-
gress must take is toward acceptance of primary responsibility over the
military apparatus of this nation. This will require that Congress,
through its committee system, devise an internal structure that keeps
Congress, as a body, current on emerging world events; that Congress
begin a long overdue assault upon the citadel of executive privilege;
that the appropriations process be tied to a substantive examination of
ongoing and future policy determinations; and that Congress effectively
respond to unilateral exercises of the war powers in a manner that indi-
cates its institutional independence.
I have suggested a few modifications of the War Powers Resolu-
tion (or of procedures in Congress) that would require Congress to at
least gaze in the direction of its responsibilities. Obviously, these small
measures will not in themselves be sufficient to overhaul a constitu-
tional structure that has been hobbled by years of abuse. It is clear,
however, that whatever measures Congress undertakes, those measures
must focus affirmatively on Congress, not upon the executive branch.
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Of course, the executive branch could contribute greatly to restoring
the constitutional balance by abandoning in both word and deed the
latitudinarian approach to presidential power in vogue over the last
few decades. That this will be accomplished in the absence of affirma-
tive congressional action is, however, the stuff that dreams are made of.
The only cure to the current scheme is an intelligently active Congress
and a public that is sufficiently concerned with our constitutional sys-
tem of government to demand as much from its representatives. Unless
Congress is willing to shoulder responsibility for the political conse-
quences of exercises of the war power, the executive can be expected to
maintain its position of virtually unlimited power.
186
Events are unfolding throughout the globe that implicate security
interests of this nation. Those events require congressional scrutiny
now-at a point when policy and objectives can be defined in the ab-
sence of a crisis flashpoint. A clear example is the United States mili-
tary build-up in Honduras. Although ostensibly the United States is
involved only in tactical manuevers, the General Accounting Office has
apparently concluded that installations being constructed by United
States Armed Forces are permanent. 87 If this is correct, a major policy
decision with wide ranging ramifications is being solidified without the
express authorization of Congress. In addition, on March 12, 1984, the
Los Angeles Times reported that United States Army pilots are flying
reconnaissance missions for the Salvadoran army from the base of op-
erations in Honduras.18 8 This creeping escalation of United States mil-
itary involvement in Central America presents a clear signal to
Congress that the time to define the scope of that involvement is now.
Congress may sit back and allow this presidential initiative and secret
186. 1 have avoided discussing the role of the Supreme Court in this constitutional break-
down. In part, this avoidance is based on a realistic assessment of the Court's reluctance to
become involved in such matters, see, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Mora
v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Douglas and Stewart, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari), and in part on a recognition that the buck of constitutional responsibility ought
to stop in the branch upon which the Constitution so clearly placed the duty. It may be,
however, that at some point the Court will have to intervene to set Congress back upon its
appointed track.
187. In the summer of 1983, when the Big Pine II operations began in Honduras, Rep.
William Alexander sent to the General Accounting Office a set of 27 questions regarding
those military exercises. See 130 CONG. REc. H813-14, H883-87 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Alexander). The purpose of the questions was to determine the extent to
which the Big Pine operation was something other than a routine training exercise. Id. In
March of 1984, the GAO delivered its report. However, the report has been classified by the
Department of Defense. See also 130 CONG. Rac. S1123 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Sasser).
188. Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1984, at part I, p. 1.
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planning to coalesce into a fixed national policy, or it may step in, as-
sess the vital needs of this nation and direct the executive branch to-
ward the accomplishment of specifically defined objectives. In short,
the opportunity to shoulder constitutional responsibility presents itself.
The question is whether Congress will accept the challenge.

